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SECRET PROCEEDINGS IN CANADA©
By IAN

National security and constitutionalism are often
thought to be fundamentally incompatible. Recent
reforms in Canada involve creative attempts to
recognize constitutional rights to fair procedure within
processes in which individuals' rights are in conflict
with state security interests, such as security clearance,
deportation, or access to information. The procedures
examined in this article include in camera and exparte
review by Federal Court judges and the use of the
Security Intelligence Review Committee. The analysis
draws on interviews with participants and compares
these procedures with other situations in which
restrictions upon open justice have faced Charter
challenge, especially under sections 2(b) and 11(d). It
is concluded that the courts have had comparatively
little direct influence but, nevertheless, there is respect
for constitutional values in some surprising places.

LEIGH*

La s6curit6 nationale et le constitutionnalisme sont
souvent consid6r6s comme fondamentalement
incompatibles. Des r6formes r6centes au Canada
comptent des essais cr6atifs de reconnatre des droits
constitutionnels aux procddures 6quitables dans le
contexte des processus oit les droits de l'individu
entrent en conflit avec les int6rats de la s6curit6
nationale, comme le contr6le s6curitaire, 'expulsion,
ou l'acc~s Al'information. Les procddures examin6es
dans cet article comprennent la revue in camera et ex
partepar les juges de la Cour f~drale et 'emploi de la
Security IntelligenceReview Committee. Cette analyse
se sert des entrevues avec des participants, et elle
compare ces procedures avec d'autres situations oil des
restrictions sur l'ouverture de la justice ont 6t6
contest6es sous la Charte,surtout selon les articles 2(b)
et 11(b). Nous concluons que les cours ont eu
comparativement tr~s peu d'influence, mais en mime
temps, que le respect des valeurs constitutionnelles
apparalt dans des endroits surprenants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Executive secrecy, especially in the realm of national security,
poses grave problems for the legal process. This is because of the need
to reconcile procedural fairness to individuals affected by contested
decisions with the safeguarding of secret material on which such
decisions are based. Governmental decisions are normally considered
legitimate within liberal democracies if they are demonstrably within the
law and are rational, principled, and proportionate. In the security
realm, the difficulty is in devising appropriate political and legal
mechanisms by which these criteria can be shown to be satisfied while
also protecting secret material. The normal constitutional processes of
adversarial legal proceedings and ministerial accountability to
Parliament may seem to the executive to be insufficiently protective of
secrecy. On the other hand, to give the executive free rein to determine
the boundaries of its actions without any independent review or control
is to invite political abuse and pays no regard to the rights of the
individual.
Canada has gone further than any other legal system in devising
novel procedures to meet these difficulties. This article is a study of the
operation / of the processes for review of a number of the situations
where individuals are affected by security decisions. What these
procedures have in common are processes by which courts or review
bodies can consider and, to some extent, probe government material
without revealing it to the individual affected by the decision under
review. A number of procedural devices are in use that depart from
normal adversarial procedures: in camera hearings, the use of special
security-cleared lawyers, and the use of designated judges with access to

1 This is a continuation and development of an earlier study of national security from a
constitutional perspective in Britain, Australia, and Canada involving extensive interviewing of
security officials and those in security oversight: L. Lustgarten & I. Leigh, In From The Cold:
NationalSecurity and ParliamentaryDemocracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) [hereinafter In

From The Cold].
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security information. The fundamental question is: to what extent can
these devices allow security and intelligence decisions to be challenged
in the same way as "normal" governmental actions?
Part II of the article provides an exploration of the public and
private interests favoured by different kinds of secret proceedings; in
particular, it distinguishes between the closure of proceedings to the
public and the withholding of information from the other party. The
general recognition given to these interests at a constitutional level is
introduced in Part III, which also deals with some analogous types of
secret proceedings. The application of these arguments to securityrelated proceedings is preceded in Part IV by an account of the
historical context of the legal treatment of security and intelligence
decisions within Canada, especially because of the influence it has had in
shaping the current legislation. In Parts V and VI, four types of secret
proceedings involving intelligence material before the Federal Court are
discussed: warrant applications for covert surveillance by the Canadian2
Security Intelligence Service (csis) under section 21 of the csis Act,
Federal Court review of decisions made concerning deportation in
refugee cases, refusal of access under freedom of information legislation,
and claims of privilege under the CanadaEvidence Act.3 The functions
of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (smc), in hearing
complaints against csis and in reviewing denials of security clearance
and deportation decisions, are discussed in Part VII. The accounts are
based partly on interviews held with participants 4 in the processes, as
well as official descriptions and relevant constitutional challenges in the
courts. Part VIII reflects upon the extent to which constitutional
arguments have succeeded in upholding open justice, and the place of
2 CanadianSecurity Intelh'gence ServiceAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 [hereinafter csisAct].

3 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 [hereinafter CanadaEvidenceAct].
4 1 am grateful to the following for interviews and assistance: Maurice Archdeacon (Executive
Director, Security Intelligence Review Committee), Alan Borovoy (General Counsel, Canadian
Civil Liberties Association), Cullen J. (Federal Court Trial Division), Heald J. (Federal Court of
Appeal), Paul Dubrule (National Security Directorate, Solicitor General Canada), Tom Bradley
and Winston Fogerty (Canadian Security Intelligence Service), Simon Noel (Nodl Bethiaume,
Avocats), Barbara Jackman (Jackman and Associates, Barristers and Solicitors), Paul Copeland

(Copeland, Liss, Campbell, Barristers and Solicitors), and John Sibley and Simon Chester
(McMillan Binch, Barristers and Solicitors). I also benefited from discussions with David Peel

(Inspector General of Security and Intelligence), and Professors Reg Whitaker (York University),
John McCamus (Osgoode Hall Law School of York University), Alan Mewett (Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto), and John LI. Edwards (Faculty of Law, University of Toronto), although
none of them is responsible for the views expressed here. I am also grateful to Clayton Ruby (Ruby

and Edwardh, Barristers and Solicitors), and to Professors Bill Angus, Reuben Hasson, and Peter
Hogg (all of Osgoode Hall Law School) for supplying useful materials.
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the courts and other review bodies in balancing individual and state
interests in these proceedings.
H. OPEN JUSTICE AND IN CAMERA TRIALS
The conduct of a trial wholly or partially in secret raises
controversial questions because of the priority generally given within the
legal system to the principle of open justice.5 The purpose of this part is
to present a framework for understanding the different interests at stake
where restrictions on publicity occur in legal proceedings.
Previously, the approach of the common law was to stress the
primacy of open proceedings except where openness would itself render
the administration of justice impracticable. 6 In 1936, Blanesburgh L.J.
went so far as to claim that publicity was the "authentic hall-mark of
judicial as distinct from administrative procedure. ' '7 The passage owes
much to the Diceyan distrust of administration, 8 and contemporary
lawyers would be less suspicious of administrative procedures and less
sanguine about judicial ones. Nevertheless, "open justice" remains a
benchmark by which procedural fairness continues to be judged.
Modern justifications for the principle are likely to be clothed in
different garb. Instead of solely emphasizing natural justice, openness is
increasingly seen as a method of ensuring the accountability of judicial
officers within a democratic polity. This view may be traced to Bentham:
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest, and evil in every shape have full swing. Only
in proportion as publicity hasplace can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice
operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of

5 G. Nettheim, "Open Justice and State Secrets" (1985-86) 10 Adelaide L. Rev. 281; In From
the Cold, supra note 1, c. 11, which discusses the principle in the context of criminal trials, mainly
from a British perspective; M.D. Lepofsky, Open Justice: the ConstitutionalRight to Attend and Speak
About CriminalProceedings (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985); P. Anisman & A.M. Linden, eds., The
Media, the Courts and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1986); and Law Reform Commission of
Canada, Public and Media Access to the CriminalProcess (Working Paper No. 56) (Ottawa: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, 1987).
6
Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C.417 (P.C.). In Canada, under the CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1985, c. C46, s. 486(1), "[t]he proper administration of justice," along with "the interests of public morals" and
the "maintenance of order" are reasons justifying the exclusion of the public from a trial.
7
McPhersonv. McPherson, [1936] A.C. 177 at 200 (P.C.).
8 Epitomized in Lord G.H. Hewart, The New Despotism (New York: Cosmopolitan Book,
1929).
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justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest guard against improbity. It keeps
the judge himself while trying under trial.9

The adage that "[]ustice is not a cloistered virtue" 10 has been
given a powerful modem restatement by Wilson J.:
[T]he public interest in open trials and in the ability of the press to provide complete
reports of what takes place in the courtroom is rooted in the need (1) to maintain an
effective evidentiary process; (2) to ensure a judiciary and juries that behave fairly and

are sensitive to the values espoused by the society; (3) to provide a shared sense that our
courts operate with integrity and dispense justice; and (4) to provide an ongoing

opportunity for the community to learn how the justice system operates and how the law
being applied daily in the courts affects them.1 1

Openness may thus be seen as a way of keeping the channels of
communication between the outside world and the courtroom free, to
the benefit of both.
Arguments in favour of publicity as a vehicle of judicial
accountability may apply even where a degree of secrecy is
acknowledged to be necessary. For example, in a decision upholding the
right (after an appropriate interval) of a member of the public to inspect
the material on which a search warrant was issued in an in camera
hearing, Dickson J. (as he then was) grounded the decision in the need
for public policy reasons to subject judicial acts to public scrutiny. He
stated that this justification was stronger if the original warrant
application was heard in camera: "[T]his fact increases the policy
argument in favour of accessibility. Initial secrecy surrounding the
issuance of warrants may lead to
abuse, and publicity is a strong
' 12
deterrent to political malversation.
It is important to disentangle two issues which, at first blush,
seem similar: the closing of proceedings to the public and the
withholding of relevant material from a defendant or complainant. Even
where the first is justified because of some overarching community
interest, it does not follow that the second will be. Although strong, the
public interest in open justice is weaker than the public interest in fair

9 J. Bentham, Rationaleof JudicialEvidence, vol. 1 (London: Hunt & Clarke, 1827) c. 10, cited
by Dickson J. in Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. Maclntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 at 183-84 [hereinafter

Maclntyre].
10

Atkin L. stated inAmbard v.Attomey-Generalfor Trinidadand Tobago, [1936] A.C.322 at

335 (P.C.): "Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and
respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men."
11 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at 1361 [hereinafter Edmonton

Journal].
12

Maclntyre, supra note 9 at 183-84.
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proceedings13 based upon a notion of "adversarialism;" the former may
be overborne by circumstances which would be insufficient to displace
the latter. For example, the defendant or party to the proceedings may
have direct knowledge of developments or events relevant to the
proceedings, of which the public as a whole are, perhaps justifiably,
ignorant. In the context of governmental secrecy, this is most likely to
occur where the defendant is a government employee, former employee,
or informer. In such circumstances, limits on the public access to the
proceedings may be justified, although limitations on the information
available to the defendant may not be. Conversely, in some situations
both the state and the other party may agree that they would prefer
proceedings to be in private, but considerations of private confidentiality
or convenience do not dispose of the community interest in public access
to legal proceedings as an aspect of democratic governance.
Deviations from the ideal of open justice may be of three kinds.
First, there are proceedings in which the public's interest is overridden
but the complainant's or defendant's is not. Examples include the
following: publication bans which prevent the reporting of evidence
given in open court; providing protective screens behind which a witness
testifies screened from the public, but in sight of the defendant, lawyers
and jury who, therefore, may still observe the witness' demeanour; 14 and
in camera hearings at which the defendant is present for the whole
proceedings, for instance in an Official Secrets trial. Disclosure of a
document for use in the proceedings on terms that prohibit its
publication have the same effect.15 Second, in some proceedings the
public interest may be adequately met but the defendant's interests are
impeded by measures taken to protect secrecy; examples might include
allowing anonymous witnesses 1 6 or disallowing certain questions on
grounds of Crown privilege. 1 7 In these situations, a denial of
13 The two interests may clash, for instance, where the effect of pretrial publicity is in issue.
Although clashes of this kind have given rise to most of the jurisprudence on open justice, especially
through the involvement of the press, they are not the central concern here.
14 The use of screens that prevent observation of demeanour by the defendant and his or her
counsel is more serious, and would fall into the third category, discussed below.
15
As in Harmanv. Secretary of Statefor the Home Department,[1983] 1 A.C. 280 (H.L.), where
contempt of court arising from breach of implied undertaking not to disclose documents obtained
on discovery.
16 See G. Marcus, "Secret Witnesses" [1990] Pub. L. 207 at 220-23, which criticizes the effects
of such orders in criminal trials on the defence.
17
This is put forward as an instance where the public interest is upheld by the court's decision,
although, in reality, whether the public interest has been favoured by the secrecy is often
controversial, quite aside from the impact on the fairness of the proceedings as it affects the other

1996]

Secret Proceedingsin Canada

information to the other party to the proceedings is a denial to the
public also. However, the impact of denying the information to the
other party is likely to be great, whereas the interference with public
interests will be minimal. The third type of deviation arises in
proceedings from which the public are excluded, and where the other
party's rights are also abridged. Examples include denying access to
those parts of the evidence which the tribunal hears and bases its
decision upon, or limiting. knowledge of the allegations, access to legal
representation, or cross-examination. The reviews of security decisions
by smc, instigated by an individual complaint or by designated judges of
the Federal Court, also fall into this category. In extreme circumstances,
restrictions in this third category may even deny an individual any
forewarning or knowledge after the event that a procedure affecting his
or her rights has been invoked. The procedure for authorizing covert
surveillance (discussed in Part V, below) is an example.
Significantly, in the context of criminal proceedings, whereas
restrictions falling into the first two categories may exceptionally be
tolerated, those falling in the third are anathema. The reticence to
impose retrictions of the first two kinds, and the failure to distinguish the
defendant's and the public's interests may also give rise to or exacerbate
the phenomenon of "graymail." "Graymail" occurs where a defendant is
able to deter the prosecution from proceeding because the prosecution
fears the consequences of a public disclosure of evidence necessary to
obtain a conviction, or necessary to enable the defendant to conduct a
proper defence.18 Implicit in the terminology is the suggestion that the
defendant's procedural rights to disclosure of prosecution evidence go
beyond those necessary to secure a fair trial, into the area where
19
embarrassment of the prosecution is an operative factor.
It is the third type of deviation that is the main focus of this
article. However, examination of developments in the first two is an aid
party.
18

The abortive prosecution of the Toronto Sun under the Official Secrets Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
0-3, s. 4(3) for communicating the contents of an intelligence report marked "Top Secret" on
Soviet espionage activities in Canada is an illustration of "graymail" in a Canadian context: see R v.
Toronto Sun (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 621 (Prov. Ct.). The case failed at the committal stage after the
prosecution had been forced to first claim Crown privilege to counter requirements from the

defence for disclosure of documents establishing an intelligence officer's view that the disclosure
was damaging, and then to alter the basis on which the prosecution was brought. For a discussion,
see SA Cohen, "Freedom of Information and National Security" in J.D. McCamus, ed., Freedom of

Information: CanadianPerspectives(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) 152.
19 In Canada (as in Britain), the "graymail" problem of disclosure of sensitive material is
partly addressed by ministerial control of prosecution discretion. Provisions enable the federal
Attorney General to take exclusive control and conduct of the proceedings by service of a fiat on the
provincial Attorney General: see Security OffencesAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-7, ss. 4 and 5.
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to clear thinking about the constitutional approach to the relevant
interests: after examining instances where they are clearly separable, we
can then approach cases where they are comingled. In the discussion
below, exclusion of the public and restrictions on disclosure to the other
party are, therefore, treated separately from a constitutional viewpoint.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
In Canadian law, the distinction between the public's and
litigant's rights is made more transparent because of the different
constitutional rights that may be invoked in support of each interest.
The press and public enjoy rights of free speech and expression under
section 2 of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms,2 0 and rely on
these to gain access to legal proceedings. It may also be argued that a
litigant has a distinct interest in public proceedings as being a public
airing of his or her case. These concerns are quite different from other
procedural guarantees, such as the presumption of innocence under
section 11(d) of Charter. In addition, litigants enjoy other Charterrights
touching on open proceedings, notably the right of a defendant in a
criminal trial to make full answer and defence, based partly upon section
11(d) and on section 7. Parties to administrative proceedings may also
rely on section 7, and on the administrative law rules of natural justice,
depending on the potential consequences. A party also may argue for
the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) on the grounds that a
Charterviolation occurred in obtaining it-for instance an unreasonable
search or seizure contrary to section 8. This may form the basis for
arguments in favour of the exclusion of evidence obtained by some
secretive or sensitive techniques, for instance wiretapping or covert
surveillance. Collateral attack on the authorization of the surveillance
may have the same effect. The Charterdoes not make express exception
from its protected rights for reasons of national security but such
limitations may fall within the general limitation in section 1,21 which has
given rise to a sophisticated jurisprudence. 22
20

Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,

c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].

21 "[S]ubject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society;" see generally P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992),
c. 35 and the literature cited therein.

22 In order to justify a limitation, the countervailing public interest concerned must pass an
initial threshhold test of amounting to a sufficiently important objective. Thereafter, further tests
apply to the form of limitation: it must be rationally connected to the public interest in question, it
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A. Exclusion of the Pressand Public23
In the post-Charter environment, restrictions on public access to
trials have been challenged in a number of contexts. One is the right
under section 11(d) for the defendant to have a fair and public trial in a
criminal case. 2 4

In the context of discussing whether legislation

establishing courts martial departing from section 11(d) of the Charter
could be justified under section 1, Lamer C.J. has expressed the view
that a very strong presumption against overriding the protections of a
normal criminal trial exists. It would only arise "in the most
extraordinary of circumstances ...[such as] ...a period of war and

insurrection." 25
However, the most extensive discussion has arisen by way of
press challenges to the closure of'proceedings, under section 2(b) of the
Charter.2 6 This has been interpreted as providing a constitutional
foundation for free access for the public to the courts, which the press,
along with other members of the public, may exercise as an integral part
of freedom of opinion and expressionZ 7 As such, it provides a powerful
additional argument to the traditional reluctance of the common law to
close judicial proceedings.
Lamer C.J. stated in the recent Supreme Court of Canada
judgment in Dagenaisv. CanadianBroadcastingCorp. that the effect of
the Charteris to adjust the common law approach so as to require equal
recognition of freedom of expression and of the right to a fair trial 8
The Court held that the common law rule allowing a publication ban by
should use the least drastic means, and should be proportionate. See especially R v. Oakes, [1986] 1

S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes];R v. EdwardsBooks andArt Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; and Reference
Re Section 94(2) ofthe Motor VehicleAc R.S.B.C. 1979, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
23 For a pre-Chartersurvey in the context of criminal trials: see A.W. Mewett, "Public
Criminal Trials" (1978-79) 21 Crim. L.Q. 199 at 211-13; post-Charter see J.P. Allen & T. Allen,

"Publication Restrictions and Criminal Proceedings" (1994) 36 Crim. L.Q 168 at 177-81.
(d) to be presumed innocent until
24 "Any person charged with an offence has the right ...

proven guilty by the law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal."
25 R v. G~nireux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 at 313. Although made in the context of the
requirement of independence of the court under s. 11(d), the point would seem to apply equally to
the other requirements of the section.
26 "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ...(b) freedom of thought, belief,

opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
27 MacKinnon A.CJ.O. in Re Southam Inc. and the Queen (No.1) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 at
123 (CA.) [hereinafter Southan No. 1], expressly contrasting simple protection of freedom of the

press perse.
28 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 877.
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a trial judge, where there was a real and substantial risk of interference
with the right to a fair trial, gave too little recognition to freedom of
expression; accordingly, the rule was modified so that a ban should only
be imposed where reasonably available alternative measures would not
prevent the risk, and the salutary effects of the ban would outweigh the
deleterious effects on freedom of expression. In a significant passage,
Lamer C.J. rejected the model of a simple clash between two Charter
rights. Rather, he drew up a balance sheet of positive and negative
effects, both of imposing and not imposing a publication ban, which
would be relevant in weighing the constitutional validity of any order.
The effects of imposing a ban could include: limiting freedom of
expression; preventing the jury from being influenced by information
from outside the courtroom; maximizing the chances of witnesses
testifying because of lack of adverse publicity; protecting vulnerable
witnesses (e.g., informants); preserving the privacy of witnesses or
victims; maximizing the chances of rehabilitation of young offenders;
encouraging the reporting of sexual offences; protecting national
security; and saving the expense of alternative forms of limitation. On
the other hand, the effects of not imposing a ban could include:
maximizing the chances of witnesses hearing of the case; placing
witnesses under public scrutiny and so helping to prevent perjury;
preventing court or state wrongdoing by placing the criminal justice
system under public scrutiny; assisting public discussion about (and so
reducing) crime; and allowing other important public debate. 29 Most of
these effects are potentially applicable in civil proceedings also.
Similar issues have arisen in relation to statutory provisions
requiring or permitting closure, when they have been subjected to
constitutional challenge. Two key questions arising from the cases are:
what discretion is there over closing the proceedings and where does the
onus of justifying closure lie? Both issues are considered against the
background of what constitutes a reasonable limitation under section
1.30

If the closure of the proceedings is mandatory, it is more likely to
fall foul of section 2(b). For instance, in Southam No. 131 it was held
that a mandatory statutory provision that juvenile courts sit in camera
29

1bid at 882-83.

30 For instance, in Edmonton Journal,supranote 11, it was held that a ban on the publication
of evidence and argument in matrimonial proceedings was a violation of s. 2(b), which could not be
justified as a reasonable limitation under s. 1 since, although intended to protect the privacy of the
parties, the ban was disproportionate in its impact.
31

Supra note 27.
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contravened section 2, and was not saved by section 1.32 Although there
were justifiable reasons for the closure of such proceedings, they did not
apply in all circumstances and, overall, the provision inflicted more
public harm than good.
Subsequent to this decision, a redrafted provision allowing for
discretionaryexclusion of the public was held to satisfy section 1. There
was a reasonable and demonstrably justifiable basis for the statutory
discretion to close proceedings-it did not have to be shown to be the
perfect solution to the problem.33 However, it is not necessarily fatal
that the closure is mandatory, since sometimes this may be justified on
public policy grounds. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Canada has
found the public policy of encouraging sexual complainants to report
alleged offences to the police justified a mandatory provision preventing
the publication of a complainant's identity.3 4 If the provision were
merely discretionary, complainants would have no assurance of
confidentiality and would be deterred from complaining. 35 Similar
reasoning underpins the lack of judicial discretion where informer
36
privilege is claimed.
The courts have affirmed the importance of open proceedings by
placing the onus on the party seeking closure to justify it. Consequently,
a provision mandating in camera hearings in applications for refugee
status was struck down as contravening section 2(b) of the Charter
because it wrongly reversed the onus by putting the burden on those
seeking to persuade the adjudicator to exercise discretion to open the

32 Ibid. The court found that the ban lacked an objective, rational basis. The significant
burden was on the proponent of a limitation under s. 1 to justify it. In considering the
reasonableness of the limitation, the court engaged in a comparative analysis of similar provisions in
other free and democratic states, but ultimately the question had to be considered in the context of
Canada's free and democratic society. Judged against these standards, a mandatory ban was not a
reasonable limit.
33
Re Southam Ina and the Queen (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 678 (H.C.J.), aff'd (1986), 53 O.R. (2d)
663 (C.A.). However, later decisions adopt a more sophisticated approach to s. 1, especially to the
least restrictive means requirement.
34

CanadianNewspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122.

35 This is really a variation on what is often called, in the context of Crown privilege, the
"candour argument." However, as expressed here, it is more credible and less damaging than in the
sexual assault context since it involves the identity of the witness rather than the substance of their
evidence.
36 See L.E. Lawler, "Police Informer Privilege: A Study For the Law Reform Commission of
Canada" (1985-86) 28 Crim. L.Q. 91 at 122-27; and T. Cooper, Crown Privilege (Aurora: Canada
Law Book, 1990) c. 7.
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proceedingsg 7 This provision gave scant recognition to the need for
quasi-judicial proceedings to be in public. Applying the Oakes38 test in
the Pacific Press case, MacGuigan J.A. found the provision to be
rationally connected to a justifiable aim (the protection of refugee
claimants)3 9 but disproportionate. The judge stressed, in particular, that
the provision did not admit less restrictive alternatives to in camera
hearings, such as the imposition of publication bans. 40 Accordingly, the
legislation failed to provide any compromise between total openness and
total closure. Moreover, it required that a final decision refusing access
be made too early in the proceedings.
The courts have also recognized that the closure of proceedings
to protect witnesses does not contravene Charter rights. 41 In R. v.
McArthur,4 2 the non-publication of the names of witnesses at a
forthcoming murder trial was held to amount to aprimafacie violation
of sections 2(b) and 11(d), but was justified as a reasonable limitation
under section 1.4 3 Dupont J. stated that non-publication of the names
would benefit the administration of justice, in view of the possibility of
witness intimidation.
All of these situations concern closure of proceedings in the
context of anticipated harm or danger to an identifiable individual from
publicity, whether the defendant, victim, or witness. Although similar
dangers may often arise in a security context, especially where the
identity of an informant or intelligence officer is concerned, the state's
interests in closure may also be more collective in nature because of the
secrecy of the information involved in the proceedings.
I However, the broader interests of the community in holding
investigatory and judicial decisions open to public gaze have also
received recognition, notably in decisions concerning public access to
executed search warrants. In a pre-Charterdecision, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that, after the event (if material is found), a member of
37

Pacific Press Ltd v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1991] 2 F.C. 327 (C.A.)
[hereinafter PacificPress];subsequently applied to read down the offending provision in the interim
in Annadale Communicationsv. Canada(Employment andImmigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 242 (C.A.).
38

Supra note 22.

39

PacificPress,supra note 37 at 346-50.
40]bid at 349.
41

Needham v. British Columbia (1992), 35 A.C.W.S. (3d) 789 (B.C.C.A).

42 (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 152 (Ont. H.CJ.).
43

So far as s. 1 was concerned, no analysis of its application was engaged in and the judgment
was, in any event, prior to the seminal decision in Oakes, supra note 22.
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the public is entitled to inspect the warrant and the information upon
which the warrant was issued. 4 4 The public interest in keeping
investigations confidential only applied upon execution of the warrrant;
likewise, protection of the innocent would only justify non-disclosure if
nothing was found when the warrant was executed. Dickson J. (as he
then was) specifically argued that the justification was stronger if the
original warrant application was heard in camera. In a later case,
decided under the Charter, a restriction preventing publication of
information about the execution of search warrants has been held to
violate section 1 for over-broadness: in particular, the court stressed that
the provision would prevent misconduct or ineptitude in executing such
warrants coming to light.45

Like its British forebear,4 6 the Canadian Official Secrets Act
provides for in camera trials. This provision, in common with the
remainder of the Act, is unreformed and, due to the paucity of recent
trials, has not yet faced Charterchallenge. The relevant section gives the
court power to exclude the public during the trial proceedings or on
appeal on the grounds that the publication of the evidence or of any
statement "would be prejudicial to the interest of the State." 4 7 The
public may be excluded from any or all of the trial, except that the
passing of sentence is required to take place in public. When this
provision was invoked in 1979 in the Treu case,4 8 it caused major
political controversy: 49 the trial was held wholly in camera, with only the
judgment and sentence being passed in open court. The procedure had
been adopted (unopposed by Treu's counsel) because the prosecution
case rested largely on evidence involving NATO documents. Although the
44

Maclntyre, supranote 9.

45

CanadianNewspapers v. Canada (A.G.) (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 737 (H.CJ.).
46 Official SecrelsAc 1920, (U.K.), 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75, s. 8(4); and Official SecretsAct 1989,
(U.K.), 1989, c. 6, s. 11(4); on both see In From The Cold, supra note 1 at 307; and R.M. Thomas,

Espionage andSecrecy (London: Routledge, 1990) at 63-68.
47 Official SecretsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-5, s.14(2).
48

Treu was convicted under the Official Secrets Act, supra note 18, s. 4, of leaking information
relating to air communications systems that he had previously obtained while working for a
government contractor. The conviction was set aside on appeal: see R. v. Treu (1979), [1980] 49
C.C.C. (2d) 222 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter Treu]. The appeal was held in open court, but Kaufman

J.A. stated that the trial judge had acted correctly in holding the trial in camera: see Treu at 225; and
Cohen, supra note 18.
49 See M.L. Friedland, National Security: the Legal Dimensions (Ottawa: Commission of
Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1980) at 35 and 46;
and J.L. Granatstein & D. Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage in Canadafrom Gouzenko to Glasnost
(Toronto: Key Porter, 1992) at 216-17 [hereinafter Spy Wars].
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Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, the holding of the trial in
camera was held to have been the correct course of action. Section 14 of
the Act has not yet received consideration under the Charter, but,
applying the principles already enunciated, it seems likely that it would
satisfy section 2(b). The discretionary nature of the judicial power to
close the proceedings, and the discretion over the extent, suggest a
proportionate response, provided the power is not used excessively in a
particular trial. The duty to pass sentence in public is a rather minimal
recognition of the arguments for public accountability, but the state
interests in question would surely satisfy section 1.
B. Restrictionson Disclosureto the Parties
Disclosure has arisen as a constitutional question mainly in the
context of a defendant's access to prosecution material in criminal
trials 50 Consequently, in R. v. Stinchcombe51 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that a defendant has a constitutional right to disclosure of
prosecution material in a criminal trial, including all evidence which may
assist the defence. Although the prosecution is not obliged to disclose
material subject to privilege or where it is clearly irrelevant, the trial
judge has the discretion to conclude that a claim of privilege is excessive
and detracts from the defendant's right to make full answer and defence.
In such an instance, the prosecution would be faced with a choice
between disclosing the material and abandoning the case.
. Similar considerations arise over the use, in a criminal trial, of
wiretapping evidence obtained through a warrant issued under the
CriminalCode.5 2 Since this is directly analogous to the treatment of
security and intelligence information, it is worth examining in some
detail. In wiretapping evidence applications, the affidavits received by
the issuing judge are placed in a sealed packet, which can only be
opened in limited circumstances. An extensive jurisprudence has grown
up on different procddural methods for seeking to exclude wiretapping
evidence so obtained, either in the course of the prosecution or under

50 Generally, the criminal law procedural standards are seen as more rigorous than the
administrative ones. Thus, the classification of courts martial as criminal courts imposed additional
constitutional standards: see J. Walker, "Military Justice: From Oxymoron to Aspiration" (1994) 32
Osgoode Hall LJ.1 at 23, discussing R v. Forster,[1992] 1 S.C.R. 339.

51 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
52 Supra note 6, ss. 184-88.
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collateral proceedings, to have the warrant declared void.53 The courts
have established both the process and the criteria according to which a
judge hearing a challenge to the authorization may open the sealed
packet54 and release to the defence the affidavit supporting the wiretap
application. These affidavits will normally contain sensitive details about
informants, especially in drug or conspiracy cases, which the prosecution
will wish to see withheld from the defence.
It has been held that the constitutional right to fundamental
justice under section 7 of the Charterrequires that the defendant should
have access to the sealed packet, subject to judicial editing of the
contents to remove information, for instance, about informants. 55 The
courts have specifically adopted a low threshhold test-it is enough that
the defendant asserts that his or her ability to make full answer and
defence requires disclosure-because they have recognized that to
impose any higher duty on the defendant (for instance to establish a
primafacie case that his or her defence could be assisted) would present
an insurmountable hurdle.56 This may appear to be a liberal approach,
but it has been defended on constitutional principles: "In practical
a
terms, it may, to some extent be a fishing expedition. It is, however,' '57
fishing expedition in what are now constitutionally protected waters.
As we shall see, the liberality of the test contrasts with the more
restrictive approach to inspection and disclosure of intelligence evidence
in criminal cases. 58
The procedure approved in Parmarwas for the trial judge 59 to
initially undertake the editing of the affidavit to ensure that disclosure is
not made which would be contrary to the best interests of the
administration of justice. The editing should be kept to the minimum.
53

Wson v. R, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594 [hereinafter Wdson].

54

As provided for under the Ciminal Code, supranote 6, s. 187(1).

551R v. Parmar(1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 260 (Ont. H.CJ.) [hereinafter Parmar],aff'd (1990), 53
C.C.C. (3d) 489 (Ont. C.A.); and R v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421.
56
Dersch v. Canada (A.G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505 at 1517 [hereinafter Dersch].
5 7 Pannar,supra note 55 at 279, Watt. J.
58 See Part VI, below.
59

Section 178.14 of the CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34; now s. 187 of the CriminalCode,
supra note 6, places the discretion to disclose on a superior court judge. The courts have stressed
that, where possible, the application should be made to the trial judge. If the trial judge is not a
superior court judge, the issue should be dealt with in a separate application, with the result
remitted to the trial judge; see Dersch, supra note 56. The same untidy division of judicial labour
can arise where a challenge under the CanadaEvidence Act, supra note 3,is made in the course of a
trial.
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Prosecution counsel then considers the edited version and may raise
objections with the judge. Any such objections are considered in open
court in the presence of the defendant and defence counsel. If there are
no objections, or they are not upheld, disclosure is made to defence
counsel. The judge's editing may be challenged if it is more extensive
than the public interest requires and if it impedes the defendant in
making "full answer and defence."60
From this brief survey of the constitutional terrain, it is evident
that the Charter has, in general, proved a powerful vehicle for
challenging restrictions on publicity and on disclosure of evidence. It
has enabled the*courts to give a clear priority to the rights both of the
press and public and of criminal defendants over other interests.
Moreover, the analysis of competing interests under section 1 has
enabled a clear and structured approach to be taken with regard to the
limitation of these rights, with more serious or automatic closure of
proceedings requiring more cogent justification. From a discussion of
the constitutional validity of a variety of closed judicial proceedings, we
turn to a more detailed analysis of secret proceedings in a security and
intelligence context. It is appropriate to set the scene with a brief
historical introduction.
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Canada's international image is of a modern democracy founded
on the respect for human rights, fostered at home by a generous
immigration policy, especially toward refugees, and by the the adoption
of the Charterin 1982. Abroad, the country's image is fostered by its

conspicuous humanitarian commitment to international peace keeping.
However, a brief study of events in the post-war period shows that where
domestic security concerns clashed with individual rights, state interests

often prevailed, with a consequent diminution of procedural fairness.
Canada's record of political persecution during the cold war is
generally considered to have been more fortunate than that of of its
southern neighbour. 6 1 However, it should be remembered that the
60 R v. Durette, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469, L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier, and McLachlin JJ.
dissenting.
61 The difference has sometimes been exaggerated. For a collection of personal recollections
of Canadians' experiences of "blacklisting" in the arts, public service, and unions, see L. Scher, The
Un-Canadians:true stories of the blacklist era (Toronto: Lester, 1992); for a more scholarly survey,
see R.Whitaker & G. Marcuse, Cold War Canada:The Making of a NationalInsecurity State, 1945.
1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) [hereinafter Cold War Canada].
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ideological purge throughout the Western world during that period
began largely as a response to events in Canada. The defection of the
Soviet Ottawa embassy cipher clerk, Igor Gouzenko, in 1945 sent shock
waves through Western governments. Gouzenko's revelations of the
penetration of Western public services led, within months, to the
exposure of several notable spies, notably the British atom-bomb spy
Alan Nunn May.62 However, following a period of consultation with
British and American authorities, it was agreed to attempt to bring those
exposed by Gouzenko to trial in all three countries: a concerted
international effort was launched to this effect in mid-February 1946. In
Canada, the immediate consequence was the establishment of an in
camera Royal Commission under Kellock and Taschereau JJ. of the
Supreme Court of Canada. 63 The Commission enjoyed extraordinary
powers under the War Measures Act. 6 4 One infamous result was the
arrest, in the early morning of 15 February 1946, of a number of
individuals named by Gouzenko, many of whom were subsequently
acquitted when put on trial due to lack of independent corroborative
evidence. Many of those arrested were held incommunicado until their
(unrepresented) appearances before the Royal Commission, apparently
in a (partially successful) attempt to prevent them receiving advice to
refuse to answer questions.65 Those who cooperated found that this
testimony was subsequently used against them in criminal trials. 66 In
some cases, even where individuals were subsequently acquitted in the
courts they were named and effectively pronounced guilty in the

62

See generally Spy Wars,supra note 49, c. 3.

63 Canada, Royal Commission Appointed Under Order in Council P.C. 411 of February 5
1946, Report of the Royal Commission [on Espionage] (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Printer to the King,
1946) [hereinafter Kellock-Taschereau](Co-Chairs R.L. Kellock & R. Tascherau JJ.).
64
R.S.C. 1927, c.206.
65 See Cold War Canada,supra note 61 at 52-74; Spy Wars, supra note 49 at 62; and R.
Bothwell & J.L. Granastein, The Gouzenko transcripts:the evidence presented to the Kellock-

TascherauRoyal Commission of 1946 (Ottawa: Deneau, 1982). The commissioners attempted to
justify the mandatory interrogation of witnesses without legal representation notwithstanding
possible criminal proceedings: see Kellock-Taschereau,supranote 63 at 672.
66
In R v. Mazerall, [1946] O.R. 762 (CA), evidence obtained before the Royal Commission

was held to be admissible in the subsequent criminal trial on the basis that the defendant had failed
to object to the questions: if he had done so he could have been compelled to answer under the
Commission's powers but the answers would have been rendered inadmissible. The Commission
studiously avoided explaining the effect of an objection to those it questioned and, furthermore,
denied witnesses the legal advice by which they might have discovered the importance of the point.
For other cases arising from the Royal Commission see R. v. Rose, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 618 (Que. KB.);

1. v. Benning, [1947] O.R. 362 (CA); and R. v. Boyer (1948), 94 C.C.C. 195 (Que. KB.).
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Commission's report. 67 The whole procedure caused considerable
political embarrassment, and there is no doubt that collective shame at
this dark moment of Canadian history has subsequently shaped the
procedures adopted to deal with security allegations of various kinds
against individuals. Apart from the Kellock-Taschereau Commission,
the legal response to the cold-war threat was generally lighter than in the
United States. However, among other anti-communist measures were
the introduction of security clearance schemes in the civil service and
informal blacklisting in a number of other areas-the notorious Quebec
"Padlock" law-and legislative amendments to the definition of treason
and to the emergency powers at the time of the Korean War.
The suspicion that all Western governments shared of the rising
tide of left-wing political, ideological, and cultural groups during the
1960s and 1970s, with the tendency to regard them as subversive, took a
quite distinct direction within Canada because of the Quebec separatist
question. The most publicly conspicuous state response was the
invocation, once again, of the War MeasuresAct 68 to proclaim a state of
"apprehended insurrection" during the October 1970 FLQ crisis. It is
now generally acknowledged that the government considerably
overreacted to the kidnapping of James Cross, the British trade attach6
in Montreal, and to the kidnapping and murder of Quebec Labour
Minister Pierre Laporte. The extended powers of search, seizure, arrest,
and detention resulted in relatively few convictions, despite widespread
use: of 497 people arrested and detained only sixty-two were charged,
and less than one-third of -these individuals were ultimately convicted.
This indiscriminate overreaction has been attributed by commentators,
in part, to a lack of reliable intelligence on the extent of threat posed by
extreme separatist groups, although more recent research suggests a
more sophisticated interplay of political factors. 69
The October Crisis, in turn, seemingly produced a backlash in
which intelligence officers were given free rein to obtain information
during the 1970s by Cabinet Ministers unwilling to delve too closely into
a variety of disreputable methods employed.7 0 Among those
67
68

Cold War Canada,supranote 61 at 74.

Supra note 64.
69 R. Whitaker, "Apprehended Insurrection? RCMP Intelligence and the October Crisis, 1970"
(1993) 100 Queen's Q. 383. On the status of the legal responses, see H. Marx, "The 'Apprehended
Insurrection' of October 1970" (1972) 7 U.B.C. L. Rev. 55; and J.N. Lyon, "Constitutional Validity
of Public Order Regulations" (1972) 18 McGill LJ. 136.
70 See G.R. Weller, "The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Under Stress" (1988) 31 Can.
Pub. Admin. 279 at 283ff.
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subsequently exposed, some were straightforwardly illegal, such as
burglary, arson, and unauthorized interception of communications, and
others were highly questionable, including the use of an agent
provocateur, attempts to disrupt pressure groups by disinformation,
bringing excessive pressure on trade unionists and other activists to act
as informers, and obtaining access to medical and other personal
records. As these tactics came to light in the late 1970s, the consequence
was the establishment of a number of Commissions of Inquiry, first at
the provincial level and then at the federal level. 71
The Commission of Inquiry established under McDonald J. into
wrongdoing by the security branch of the RCMP was perhaps the most
thorough independent investigation into the activities of an intelligence
agency ever conducted, and had a decisive impact in shaping legislative
reforms and attitudes. Not only was this the direct precursor of the
"delicate balance" 72 contained in the csis Act, 73 but the events
surrounding the Commission live on in the corporate memory of the
now civilianized csis, an influence apparently favouring protection of
privacy as csis interviewees for this research freely admitted. Following
the report of the McDonald Commission, 74 a new civilian domestic
intelligence agency was created, replete with oversight mechanisms, by
71 The Commisions spawned several legal challenges to their attempts to obtain evidence,
based upon Crown privilege. The case that led to the establishment of the McDonald
Commmission, infra note 74, is an example: in the prosecution of a policeman for planting a bomb,
his claim to withhold the name of an associate who allegedly told him to go to the premises was
refused by the judge. See R. v. Samson (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 258 (Que. CA). Closely related
were two of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada; both involved attempts by the
police to use the privilege to withhold information from Provincial Commissions of Inquiry, which
were set up to investigate security abuses by the RCMP and provincial police forces. In the first, the
court held that the police and the RCMP could not raise the privilege to impede the Keable
Commission in Quebec without the Attorney General's consent, which was conspicuously withheld:
see Bissailon v. Keable, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60. However, the claim was more successful in the second,
where the investigation of the Ontario Royal Commission (the Krever Commission) into
unauthorized police access to medical records was impeded as a result: see Canada (Solicitor
General) v. Royal Commission ofInquiry into Confidentiality of Health Records in Ontario, [1981] 2
S.C.R. 494. For critical discussion, see J.F. Harris, "Solicitor General Canada v. The Royal
Commission of Inquiry Into The Confidentiality of Health Records in Ontario; Opening the Files
for the Rcmp" (1983) 12 Man. L.J. 399; and D.B. Evanson, "The Development and Power of the
Informer Privilege: The Health Records Inquiry Case" (1984) 9 Queen's LU. 207.
72 See Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Senate Committee on the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Delicate Balance: A Security Intelligence Service in a
Democratic Society (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1983) (Chair: P.M. Pitfield).
73 Supra note 2.
74 Canada, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, Freedom and Security
under the Law, Second Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981) (Chair: D. McDonald) [hereinafter
McDonald Commission Report].
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the csisAct. TheAct setformal limits to the csIs's mandate and powers,
provided a system of ministerial control, and created new bodies to
oversee the propriety and legality of its actions and, in some cases,
decisions based on its advice. These bodies were an Inspector General
and a non-parliamentary committee of Privy Councillors (SIRC). This
scheme was reviewed after five years of operation by a Special
Parliamentary Committee 7 5 and has been the subject of continuous
review by sIRc itself; it has also attracted the attention of the courts. The
account in the sections following focuses on the positions of the Federal
Court and of smc in handling secret proceedings within this framework.
V. JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION OF COVERT SURVEILLANCE:
SECTION 21 OF THE CSIS ACT
Following the findings of the McDonald Commission that csis's
predecessor, the RCMP Security Service, had broken the law in
conducting surveillance, it was recommended that the new civilian
agency be granted statutory powers of covert entry and surveillance.
These were to be subject to a judicial warrant process, thus conferring
lawful powers for actions previously illegal. 76 In so recommending, the
McDonald Commission was seeking to give effect to its guiding
principles: (1) the rule of law should be strictly observed; (2)
investigative techniques should be proportionate to the security threat
under investigation and weighed against possible damage to civil
liberties and democratic structures; (3) less intrusive alternatives should
be used wherever possible; and (4) control of discretion should be
layered so that the greater the invasion of privacy, the higher the level of
necessary authorization.77
At first, the government omitted a requirement for judicial
authorization from its legislative reforms but, following stringent

75 Canada, House of Commons, In Flux But Not in Crisis,Report of the Special Committee on

the Review ofthe csisAct and the Security OffencesAct (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1990) [hereinafter
In Flux]; see also the government's response: Canada, Solicitor General, On Course: National
Securityfor the 1990s (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1991) [hereinafter On Course].
76 Comparable powers exist in the United Kingdom for ministerial warrants under the
Intelligence ServicesAct 1994, (U.K.), 1994, c. 14, ss. 5 and 6; see also In From The Cold, supra note 1,
c. 3 and at 493ff.
77
McDonald Commission Report, supranote 74, vol. 1 at 513ff; for an extended discussion see
In From The Cold,supra note 1, c. 2.
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criticism, the csis Bill was reintroduced incorporating a warrant
requirement for certain types of surveillance. 78
The McDonald Commission's concerns are reflected both in the
statutory framework and in the administrative practices that have grown
up to govern warrant applications. All of csis's investigations, whether
they require special powers or not, are subject to section 12 of the csis
Act, which establishes a precondition that the collection, retention, and
analysis of information must be "strictly necessary" to investigation of
threats to the security of Canada. After approval by the Solicitor
General, a warrant application may be made where there are
"reasonable grounds" for csis's belief that it is required to enable the
Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to assist in its
foreign intelligence-gathering function. It is a requirement either that
other investigatory techniques have failed, would be unlikely to succeed,
would not obtain important information, or would be impractical on
grounds of urgency.7 9 The Act also requires an accompanying affidavit
specifying in detail the person targetted, premises involved, and types of
information concerned: these details are to be reflected in the scope of
the warrant, together with "such terms and conditions as the judge
considers advisable in the public interest."8 0 Actions that may be
authorized include covert entry to premises, installation of bugging and
visual surveillance equipment, removal and copying of documents, and
the surreptitious installation of tracking equipment on vehicles. Such
actions in execution of a warrant receive immunity from criminal and
civil liability.8 '
An elaborate system of screening warrant applications before
submission to the Solicitor General and the court has been established.
This involves initial approval of all investigations proposing active
intelligence gathering by an internal Target Approval Review
Committee (TARC), and prior vetting of covert surveillance applications
by a Warrant Review Committee. TARC authorization of targetting is
formally graded, with the most intrusive surveillance, level 3, requiring
78

Bill C-157, An Act to Establish the CanadianSecurityIntelligence Service, 1st. Sess., 32d Parl.,

Canada, 1983; and Bill C-9, the amended legislation of January 1984 that ultimately passed in June
1984. On the history of Bill C-157, see C. Franks, "Parliamentary Control of Security Activities"
(1984) 29 McGill L.J. 326; and R. Whitaker, "The Politics of Security Intelligence Policy-Making in

Canada" (1991) 6 Intelligence and Nat'l Sec. 649; continued in (1992) 7 Intelligence and Nat'l Sec.
53 [hereinafter Politicsof Security].
79

csisAct, supra note 2, s. 21(2).

80/Ibid s. 21(4)(f).
81Ibid.ss. 24 and 25, as am. by S.C. 1993, c. 34, s. 49.
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satisfaction of more stringent criteria. Following a 1987 government
report by the former clerk of the Privy Council that criticized Csis's
procedures, and a furore that erupted when it emerged that a number of
inaccurate or misleading details had been laid before the courts in an
application for surveillance arising out of the bombing of an Air India
airplane in 1985, this scheme was revised 8 2 After that warrant was
successfully challenged by one of the targets at his trial and Csis
informed the original judge what had happened, the warrant was
quashed and the director of csis resigned. It became apparent during
interviews with csis officers that the avoidance of public scandal now
weighs heavily on all those involved with the process.83 The reaction to
this episode was a typically bureaucratic one-the adding of extra stages
to the warrant approval process, both regionally and centrally. Perhaps
inevitably, the entire process sank beneath its own weight as a result:
before simplification, it involved no fewer than thirty-seven stages and
the approximately six-month delay inherent in the process was seen by
csis as a serious operational impediment. Simplification came as a result
of a report commissioned by csis from a recently retired Federal Court

82 See Canada, Independent Advisory Team on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
People and Process in Transition:Report to the Solicitor General (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1987)
(Chair: G.F. Osbaldeston) [hereinafter OsbaldestonReport]; see also Spy Wars, supra note 49 at 24445; and on the legal issues, see Atwal v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1988] 1 F.C. 107 (T.D.)
[hereinafterAtwa/J.
83
The most recent scandal about csis surveillance (the Bristow affair) concerned an informer
and was therefore beyond the scope of the statutory procedure, although presumably subject to
approval under TARC (this view was expressed by a former Deputy Director of csis, Phillipe Bibeau:
see K. Makin, "Former Deputy Defends Csis" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail, (2 September 1994)
Al. It involved allegations that Grant Bristow, a prominent member of a white supremacist group,
the Heritage Front, was a csis informer who had also passed information about Jewish
organizations to similar groups in the United States, and had also passed information about the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Reform Party. A subsequent investigation by SIRC
criticized csis practices in relation to informers but found many of these allegations
unsubstantiated: see Canada, Security Intelligence Review Committee, The Heritage Front Affair:
Report to the Solicitor Generalof Canada, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1994); and Canada, Security
Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report 1994-95 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1995) at 3-16
[hereinafter sIRc 1994-95]; but, for a critical review of the report, see R. Whitaker, "The Bristow
Affair: a Crisis of Accountability in the Canadian Security Intelligence" (Paper presented to the
Canadian Association of Security Intelligence Studies, Montreal, 5 June 1995) [unpublished]
[hereinafterBristow Affair]. A further report on the Bristow affair was recently published: Canada,
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs The HeritageFrontAffair:
Our View (First Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1996).
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judge, Addy J., who had previously been designated to hear cSis warrant
applications under the legislation.8 4
The Addy Report8s recommended a reduction in the number of
stages to thirty-four, with a resulting compression of lead times, and
some changes in the way that warrant applications and supporting
affidavits were prepared for court. In the preparation of the report, the
serving designated judges were "informally consulted" by their former
colleague. The report was received in September 1992 and implemented
by csis with some modifications, designed to achieve the same effect as
the original proposals, in 1993. At the time of interviews in June 1994,
the process was still subject to further fine tuning and was under review
by the Inspector General of Security and Intelligence. While, from an
outside perspective, it is not possible to be definitive about the
effectiveness of these procedures, the process of review involving legal
policy and oversight input at least corroborates Csis's professed emphasis
on legality.
One of the recommendations of the Addy Report was that there
should be greater lawyer involvement from an early stage in the
preparation of applications to go to the Federal Court. Consequently,
csis lawyers are now involved in warrant applications from the beginning
and the counsel who will present the case in court drafts the supporting
affidavit. The process still involves approval of the targetting by TARC at
level 3 and, thereafter, submission to the Warrant Review Committee
(wRc), including an oral testing of the case by an independent counsel
(an innovation introduced following the Osbaldeston Report8 6 ). The
independent counsel are a pool of about six security-cleared lawyers
from the Justice Department, who will have had no previous association
with the case. About a week before the WRc hearing, the independent
counsel is given access to all the relevant documentation. His or her task
is to test the statement of facts to be included in the affidavit supporting
the warrant in order to establish that the information concerned appears
in csis records, appears reliable, is accurately reflected in the affidavit,
and is presented in its proper context. After this process of internal
review, culminating an approval by the wRc, the case is forwarded to the
Solicitor General, in whose name the formal application is made to the
84

A request to have access to the unpublished Addy Report as part of this research was refused
on the grounds that the deletions necessary before it could be released under the Access To
InformationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-i, would have been so extensive as to render it worthless: Letter

of T. Bradley (csis) to . Leigh, 9 September 1994.
85

Supra note 84.

86

On Course, supranote 75 at 63.
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Federal Court. The Solicitor General's role was described as being one
of policy review;8 7 for instance, the Minister might consider whether the
proposed target is the kind of person in whom csis should be taking an
interest. However, the Minister may also add conditions at this stage.
Commonly there will have been consultation between csis and the
Solicitor General's Department prior to the warrant application being
made, and it is rare for a proposal for a warrant application be rejected
by the Minister. Any disagreements are dealt with before this stage: it
was stressed that Ministers like to receive unequivocal advice from their
officials, and do not regard it as their role to arbitrate in disputes
between bureaucrats.
The csis Act provides for the warrant application to be made
before the Chief Justice or a "designated judge" of the Federal Court
(Trial Division).8 8 This process was established under the legislation in
conscious imitation of the American approach to surveillance. 8 9 After
the csis Act was passed, Heald J. (one of the earliest judges designated)
and two officials went to Washington to study and report on the
operation of the American system. Following this visit it was decided
that it was unnecessary for hearings to take place outside of Ottawa,
notwithstanding that csis is a regionally based organization and that
applications for warrants come from all over the country. In practice, an
application will be forwarded to the central office of csis and officers
there will make the application in Ottawa on behalf of the regional
branch. Another reason given for the designation of Federal Court
judges was the need to restrict, to a minimum, the number of individuals
to be vetted to deal with secure information. Consequently, initially only
three or four judges were designated, although the number has now
risen to six or seven.9 0 The advantage of the "designation" system is that
it allows the judges concerned to build up some expertise in these types
of cases. One disadvantage is that if the product of the surveillance is
used in a subsequent criminal trial (for instance, in a terrorist
prosecution as inAtwal9 l), any challenge to evidence obtained under the
warrant will require that part of the case be determined in the Federal
87 Interview with P. Dubrule, National Security Directorate, Solicitor General Canada
(Ottawa, 20 June 1994).
88
csisAct, supra note 2, s. 2.
89

See ForeignIntelligence SurveillanceAct, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978) [hereinafter FISA].

90 A request made to the Chief Justice for a full list of past and present "designated" judges
was courteously refused after "appropriate" consultation, for unspecified reasons: Letter of J.A.
Isaac, Chief Justice (F.C.T.D.) to I. Leigh, (18 July 1994).
91

Supra note 82.
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Court, rather than by the (provincial) trial judge, with a resulting
dislocation of proceedings.
In practice, the judges are on duty for one week in turn and may
be called upon at any time of day or night to sit to hear emergency
applications. Although the judges' perception is that they are may be
called at unpredictable times to hear applications, the picture presented
by csis was of months of painstaking preparation before an application is
made; plainly, however, this does not preclude emergency applications.
The hearings take place in a secure room within a secure building, which
has been swept for bugging devicesY 2 The judge will usually have
received the papers for the hearing earlier in the day and have had
several hours in which to read the documents submitted for the
application. Typically, the documentation includes a lengthy affidavit
submitted-by csis setting out the background to the case and the reason
why surveillance of the target is deemed to be "necessary" within the
terms of the legislation. Where csis is requesting surveillance in support
of its foreign surveillance gathering power, 93 an affidavit may be
submitted on the policy background in the country concerned. At the
hearing itself, the deponent, usually a senior policy officer in csis, will be
available together with the lawyer assigned to csis by the Justice
Department and sometimes a lower level csis officer who has more
direct knowledge of the case and of the sources. The judge will normally
wish to hear the deponent's further evidence and will ask questions
arising out of the sworn statement. Both judges interviewed stated that
they regarded their role in such hearings as being similar to that where
an unassisted party is before the court in litigation in person: hence, they
would take on some of the burden of cross-examining the witnesses to
make up for the absence of the "target" from the proceedings.
Evidence about the effectiveness of this system of judicial
scrutiny is hard to evaluate. One judge has claimed:
Judicial intervention was not required to allow the Service to conduct surveillance
effectively; that could, more conveniently, have continued under executive fiat. It was
required to protect potential targets against unjustified surveillance and to assure the
public that such protection was being effectively afforded. The benefit of judicial
intervention to the Service and, thus, to Canada, will be imperilled if it is presented to
and perceived by the public as primarily a function of the intelligence gathering system
rather than of the judicial system. ... What must be sought here is the maximum

92 csts Act, supra note 2, s. 27 merely stipulates that hearings shall be in private; s. 28 provides
for regulations to be made to govern the hearings but none have been made in fact.
93

/bd. s. 16, as am. by S.C. 1995, c. 5, s. 25; the power enables Csis to assist in relation to the
defence of Canada or the conduct of Canada's international relations on the personal request of the
relevant ministers, provided Canadians are not targetted.
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accountability and accessibility of and to the judicial presence in the intelligence
gathering system but not to the extent of impairing the investigation of genuine threats to
national security. ... [T]he credibility of the Service has a direct and positive, but by no
means exclusive, dependency on the credibility of the judicial presence in the system;
since judicial credibility is so dependent on openness, the Service, too, has an interest in
the openness of that judicialpresence. 94

In interviews, csis argued that the main constraint on the issue of
warrants was the process of internal review, rather than that of judicial
scrutiny. However, this internal mechanism has been established at least
partly to prevent problems arising before the judge. Neither of the
judges interviewed knew of any case (out of several hundred; see Table
I, below, for figures for 1988-95) in which an application for a warrant
had been refused outright. 95 This was the only question that the Csis
officers interviewed refused to answer (although the Service's record was
described as a good one in such applications). However, if the judges
were unable to point to an application that had been refused, it was
suggested that a small number had been voluntarily withdrawn by the
Service in the face of judicial hostility at the hearing, and that in many
more cases the judges had imposed conditions upon the grant of the
warrant. In practice, some of these conditions 96 have become standard
(such as the protection of attorney-client privilege) but others may be
tailored to meet the facts of each individual case. 97 There was some
suggestion that experience of applications in the early years of the
legislation had led to changed practices and expectations on behalf of
the Service: this was one judge's view. Apparent confirmation came in
csis's suggestion that many conditions were now volunteered in the
warrant application so as to minimalize the invasion of privacy. Where
the warrant application is one for renewal of the warrant (each may last
up to a year98 ), the judge will commonly have available, in an updated

94

Atwal,supra note 82 at 139.40, Mahoney J.

95 This seems to mirror American experience with Fisa, supra note 89. A 1995 study found
that the court had approved 7,539 warrant applications by the U.S. Justice Department to conduct
electronic surveillance on grounds of national security since 1987 and denied only one application:
see P. Colangelo, "The Secret FisA Court: Rubber Stamping on Rights" (1995) 53 Covert Action 43
at 4349.
96 The Special Parliamentary Committee's proposal that the standard conditions be
incorporated in the legislation has not been implemented: see In Flux, supra note 75 at 123.
97
Examples of judicial conditions imposed on the use of the csisAct, supra note 2, s. 21, may
be found inAtwal,supranote 82 at 120-21.
98
csisAct, supra note 2, s. 21(5). The Parliamentary Committee believed that this period was
excessive: see In Flux, supra note 75 at 231. Counter Subversion warrants have a maximum duration
of sixty days.
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affidavit, some evidence of what the surveillance previously authorized
under the warrant has produced, and why a further extension is
necessary. This is the nearest that the judge will get to "feedback" on
the usefulness of the warrant.
There are several notable gaps in these figures that make them
difficult to interpret. As already noted, refusal rates are not published.
Although Table I, below, shows a dramatic growth in warrants issued
since 1990-91, smc has been at pains to point out that this is not
necessarily because of a corresponding growth in csis activity requiring
authorization. 99 smc notes that comparison between years to denote
trends is difficult for two reasons. First, a given warrant may cover many
or a few individuals, so the number of warrants is not necesarily a helpful
indicator of csis activity or a measure of the extent of individual privacy
invaded. Second, the figures reflect changing interpretations by the Csis
of when a warrant is required.
Table I
New and Renewed Warrants under csIs Act, Section 21

New Warrants
Renewals
TOTAL

1988-89

1989-90

1990-91

1991-92

1992-93

1993-94

1994-95

55
35
90

34
50
84

27
51
78

39
73
112

32
115
147

85
103
188

85
130
215

Source: SIRc Annual Reports.

This last point is an interesting example of the ripple effect of
Charterdecisions as they are internalized by bureaucrats. For example,
the ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Duart6100 that
consensual or participant monitoring of conversations requires legal
authority (i.e., a warrant) led to an instantaneous change in Csls practice.
Although the judgment was handed down in the context of police
practice in criminal investigations, the implications for security
investigations were anticipated and, moreover, Csis applied the principle

99

See, for example, Canada, Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report 1993-94
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1994) at 29 [hereinafter smc 1993-94].
100 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Duartej.
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also to video recordings in advance of any court ruling to that effect.101
Similarly, a decision requiring the naming in the warrant of all known
suspects in criminal wiretapping applications, 102 rather than relying on
formulae such as "persons unknown" (so-called "basket clauses") 103 has
been applied by analogy to csis warrants. In interviews, SIRC officials
stated that csis had also changed its practices in several other respects
leading to an increased figure for warrants. These included obtaining
more than one warrant where postal interception was employed so that
postal workers would not see, from the face of the warrant, the other
surveillance techniques employed, and obtaining warrants for telephone
toll (metering) 10 4 surveillance and for access to bank data where these
were done "informally" in the past.
Ex postfacto review of surveillance under warrant is the role of
the other personnel operating within the oversight machinery (smc and
the Inspector General). In practice, both SIRC and the Inspector
General attempt to review the use of section 21 powers by each
randomly sampling four applications annually, divided between Counter
Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. An example of successful review
cited was one in which sIRc complained about a warrant in respect of a
fax machine to which multiple users other than the target had access.
However, from smc's perspective, the usual purpose of this exercise is
not to "second guess" the judge who granted the warrant, but rather to
check that the affidavit submitted in support of the application "fairly
and completely" represented the file information available to csis (i.e.,
that the affidavit was a balanced representation of the situation). To this
end, sIRc checks the stages undergone before submitting the affidavit.
The reviewing officer will be concerned that there are no obvious jumps
in logic and that fact and opinion have been clearly differentiated in
submitting the application. The description of this review process
mirrors the task of the Independent Counsel, depicted above. In SIRC'S
view, the quality of the supporting affidavits has improved since

101 Canada, Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report 1989-90 (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1990) at 14-15 [hereinafter SJRc 1989-90]; the Supreme Court later so ruled in R. v.
Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36.
102 R. v. Chesson, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 148 [hereinafter Chesson], holding that because one of the
appellants, Vanweenan was known to the police at the time of the warrant application but not
named in it, evidence obtained through the wiretapping under warrant could not subsequently be
adduced against her. See sIRc 1994-95,supra note 83 at 32.
103
Chesson, sapra note 102 at 164-65.
104 The practice of recording the phone numbers of telephones called but not the
conversation.
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1984-initially affidavits were "full of unsupported opinions and
conclusions." 105 But now, due to the involvement of the Department of
Justice lawyer, they are considerably improved. Review by the Inspector
General has also led to findings that the affidavits were insufficiently
accurate on factual questions prior to these changes 0 6 The Inspector
General has also monitored the Service's execution of section 21
directives and warrant conditions
warrants and found that the ministerial
107
were being satisfactorily followed.
Attitudes were mixed about the need for reform of the
procedure. Understandably, csis officials stated that they were satisfied
with the procedure as it stood and felt that it adequately protected their
interest. Proposals for reform have come from other quarters. The
Special Parliamentary Committee suggested that a "devil's advocate" be
introduced to contest the need for the warrant before the judge. Unlike
the Independent Counsel, the devil's advocate would be a nongovernment lawyer (from a list of security-cleared counsel drawn up by
the Federal Court in consultation with the Canadian Bar Association)
who would be briefed to act independently and to challenge the csis
case.108 It was clear fr6m an interview with an officer in the Solicitor
General's Department that the government's decision not to implement
this recommendation 1 9 was based on political considerations,
specifically, that the then Minister did not wish to share involvement in
security decisions with anyone else. The judges interviewed both took
the view that a devil's ddvocate would be an improvement over the
current procedures and would assist the court in fulfilling its role.
However, one judge pointed out that the court has the inherent ability to
appoint, if necessary, amicus curiae to fulfill a similar role. In practice it
seems that this has never been resorted to, although it has been
threatened on one or two occasions.
More sweeping criticism of Csis's powers under section 21 has
come from civil libertarians. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association
(CcLA) has argued consistently, since before the establishment of CsiS,
that federal investigatory and intrusive powers are excessive, because
105 Interview with M. Archdeacon, Executive Director of slRc (Ottawa, 21 June 1994).
106

S1RC 1989-90, supra note 101 at 15.

10 7

1Whd [emphasis added].

108 In Flux,supra note 75 at 125. Alternatively, the same panel of private practitioners
currently used by smc for complaints hearings could be used: see Part VII, below.
109
On Course, supra note 75 at 64. The Government flatly rejected the Special Committee's
recommendation, adding only that implementing a devil's advocate as part of the csxs affidavit
process."
procedure "would not enhance the rigour of the ...
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they allow for the targetting of Canadian citizens and permanent
residents where they are not suspected of law breaking. 10 The CCLA
would like to see both the powers under warrant under section 21 of the
csis Act and other intrusions (including the gaining of access to
confidential records and the use of informants) restricted to instances in
which there are reasonable grounds to believe that the target has, is, or is
going to commit a serious security-related breach of the law.111 The
ccLA's stance has led it to lobby in the political arena-for instance, by
submitting a brief before the Special Parliamentary Committee and by
112
challenging the constitutionality of aspects of the csIsAct.
In the CCLA'S view, limitation of the Csis mandate should go
hand-in-hand with organizational reform so that csis becomes part of a
law enforcement agency once again (reversing, in a sense, the
civilianization that occurred following the McDonald Commission
Report113 ). It was perceived that the resulting increased likelihood of ex
postfacto challenges would act as a form of self discipline. However, it is
noteworthy that even without such reform, csis interviewees repeatedly
referred to the operational corrective of the fear of public exposure and
scandal as a major consideration.11 4 Nevertheless, if restriction of the
mandate to matters of criminality is desirable, it seems better that it be
achieved through legislative reform, rather than through self restraint

110

See generally Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Review of the csis
Act and the Security Offences Act, Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence of the Special Committee,
vol. 1 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1990) at 8:21-51, testimony of Alan Borovoy, General Counsel,
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (16 January 1990).
111 Ibid.
112 Corporationof the CanadianCivil LibertiesAssociation v. Canada (A.G.) (1992), 8 O.R.
(3d) 289 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [hereinafter ccL4]. It was held on a preliminary point in Re
Corporationof Canadian Civil LibertiesAssociation and Attorney-General Canada (1990), 74 O.R.
(2d) 609 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [hereinafter Re ccLA] that the Association had locus standi to
challenge the provisions: Potts J. held, at 619, that although the Association itself did not claim to
have been targetted by csts, it was able to challenge the legislation since, in view of the surreptitious
nature of csis surveillance, a clear instance of use of the powers was otherwise unlikely to arise in
litigation and the legislation would have been effectively immune from constitutional challenge.
113
Supra note 74, vol. 1 at 19-22. This is a striking viewpoint in view of the events leading up
to the report. However, the ccLA's General Counsel, Alan Borovoy, argues that the abuses
committed by the RCMP were less a product of its law-enforcement role than of its exalted status as a
national institution; for an account which juxtaposes the abuses with the RCMP'S traditional image,
see On GuardFor Thee (Part3)-Shadows of the Horseman (Montreal: National Film Board/cBc,
1981).
114 Prophetically as it turned out: within three months of the interviews, the Heritage Front
affair,supra note 83, came to light.
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within CSIS. 1 1 5

The same point applies to the oversight mechanisms

under the css Act: however valuable smc, in particular, is, it is not a
substitute for more closely guarded legal powers, since its function is
review of the existing powers.
The CCLA's arguments that Csis's mandate represents a threat to
law abiding Canadians because the mandate is both overextensive and
vague, have found little favour in the courts. A challenge to Csis's
mandate and powers based on their alleged effect in "chilling" freedom
of expression, assembly, and association failed in the Ontario Court
(Gen. Div.). 11 6 Potts J. rejected the notion that such an argument, based

largely on citizens' fears and suspicions, demonstrated the infringement
of constitutional rights.1 17 An argument based upon infringement of
privacy relating to the use of powers under section 21 warrants was more
successful in that the section was, in general terms, found to restrict
recognizable freedoms. However, on analysis of the relevant criteria, the
provision contained an objective standard by which the Federal Court
judge could balance the state and individual privacy8 interests, as
required with surveillance for law enforcement purposes.
Whereas the CCLA case 119 concerned a hypothetical use of
section 21, the provision has successfully passed Charterchallenge in an
instance of its use in practice. In Atwal,120 an attempt was made to
attack a warrant issued under section 21 so as to prevent the admission
in a subsequent terrorist trial of the evidence obtained. The Federal
Court of Appeal held that the section did not violate section 8 of the

115 Thus, while recognizing that the disbandment of the counter-subversion branch of csis has
probably led to a reduction in unacceptable csis surveillance, the CCLA nevertheless wishes to see.

the csrsAct amended to exclude subversion.
116 Re ccL4,supra note 112.

117 ccL,4, supra note 112. Potts J. applied the two stage test from Irwin Toy Limited v. Quebec
(A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, requiring both the activity in question to fall within a protected sphere
of conduct and the purpose of the impugned legislation to be to restrict a protected activity. The

freedom of expression argument was rejected when the judge found that "chilling effect" had not
been adopted within Canadian doctrine to determine the scope of conduct protected under the
Charter. The challenges based on freedom of assembly and association failed because, while they
were within the protected sphere, the applicant did not establish that the purpose of the legislation
was to restrict these freedoms. An argument that the csisAct contravened s. 7 of the Charterfailed

on the ground that the purpose was not to restrict personal decision making.
118 See Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. However, the judge was undecided on

whether a test of this kind was appropriate in view of the intelligence-gathering function of csas;
compareAtwal, supra note 82 at 133, Mahoney J.
119

cct., supra note 112.

120

Supra note 82.
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Charter. The majority found that different standards were to be applied
to national security cases than those applicable to criminal
investigations; the standard of "credibly-based probability"121 of an
offence, required in criminal cases before an invasion of privacy could be
countenanced, was not appropriate. The csis Act standard is lower in
two respects: it only requires "reasonable suspicion" of a threat to the
security of Canada (one opinion describes this as "a bona fide partial
belief that a particular activity may constitute a threat"12 ); second, the
field of threats to security is wider than activities which could constitute
criminal offences. Huggeson J. dissented strongly, and argued that the
tests of compatibility for searches in a criminal investigation context
should apply. In his view, section 21 failed to demonstrate a reasonable
and proportionate relationship between the relevant state interest and
the proposed intrusion. He argued that the language of section 21 did
not provide an objective standard by which the judge could test the need
for a warrant.
There is no requirement to show that the intrusion to the citizen's privacy will afford
evidence of the alleged threat or will help to confirm its existence or non-existence.
Nothing in the language of the statute requires a relationship between the information it
is hoped to obtain from the intercepted communication and the alleged threat to the
security of Canada. 123

Although the majority inAtwal rejected a direct analogy with the
criminal law standard in applying section 8, they nevertheless ordered
disclosure to the defendant of the csis affidavit submitted in support of
the warrant application. Here the reasoning was by direct analogy with
the practice in search warrant and CriminalCode wiretapping cases: the
disclosure was necessary to enable the defendant to attack the
warrant. 124
However, the Court clearly envisaged a successful
application by csis for non-disclosure of the affidavit on grounds of
Crown privilege: disclosure was ordered on the technical basis that
instead of waiting for an application of this kind, the trial judge had
suppressed the affidavit on his own initiative. The warrant was quashed
by agreement for admitted inaccuracies in the affidavit and so disclosure

121 Ibid.at 133.
122
123

In Flux, supranote 75 at 121.

Atwal, supra note 82 at 151. By illustration, he argued that hypothetically a warrant might
fulfill the statutory criteria if its purpose was to obtain material to enable csis to blackmail the
target into becoming an informer. •
124 See MacIntyre,supra note 9; Wilson,supra note 53; and Atwal, supra note 82 at 134-35,
Mahoney 3.
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never took place in the event.. Atwal was decided before the Supreme
Court judgments providing for judicial editing of wiretapping affidavits
prior to disclosure,1 25 and so this alternative was not considered by the
Federal Court of Appeal. In principle, there is no reason why the issuing
judge could not edit the csis affidavit prior to disclosure where that was
necessary to enable a criminal defendant to make full answer and
defence. If designated Federal Court judges are competent and
appropriate personnel to weigh such affidavits in considering section 21
applications in the first place, it would be inconsistent to argue, on the
basis of a difference between security and criminal matters, that they
would be unable to carry out such editing. Similarly, the logic of public
inspection of search warrants issued in camera would appear equally
applicable to section 21 warrants, on grounds of accountability of CSls
and of the judiciary to the public.126 However, in practice it is hard to
envisage the courts ordering such disclosure, because of the public
interest in secrecy concerning csis's surveillance, and it may be argued
that review by smc and the Inspector General substitute for public
scrutiny of this kind.
Following Atwal, the government professed itself satisfied that
section 21 complied with section 8 of the Charterand was not in need of
reform.127 Although the Special Parliamentary Committee anticipated
that a body of case law based on examination of the special requirements
of national security would build up in the courts, so adjusting section 21
to the Charter,128 this has not materialized in fact, perhaps because of
the internal reforms already discussed. In practice, the Charterhas had
its main impact on the use of this power through internalization of its
standards in anticipation of what the courts would do, rather than
through ex post facto judicial review.
From the jurisdiction of Federal Court judges in authorizing csis
actions in advance, we turn now to situations in which the judiciary is
involved in review after the event of decisions dependent on security and
intelligence advice.

125 See supranotes 55-60.
126 See supranotes 44-45 and accompanying text.

127 See On Course, supranote 75 at 65.
128 See In Flux, supranote 75 at 119.
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VI. FEDERAL COURT REVIEW
Whereas designated Federal Court judges have jurisdiction
under section 21 on an exparte basis, there are a further three forms of
proceedings where similarly designated judges conduct a form of review
on security questions arising in contested proceedings. These are,
respectively: where a person claiming refugee status is deported under a
ministerial certificate alleging that their presence is a threat to the
security of Canada; where an appeal is made against the use of an
exemption under freedom of information legislation; and where a claim
of privilege against disclosure is made under the CanadaEvidence Act.
In each case, the legislation gives the other party a restricted opportunity
to argue against the government's claim, without giving access to the
contested information. This requires sensitive procedural protections so
as not to prejudice the secret material, but, nevertheless, respects the
adversarial rights of the contesting party.
Most immigration, deportation, and citizenship cases with a
security aspect are dealt with through SIRC review (described in Part VII,
below). 12 9 However, a variation on these procedures, involving not SIRC
but determination of the issues by the courts, applies in refugee cases.
In such cases, section 40.1 of the ImmigrationAct provides for a form of
judicial review of a ministerial certificate where security is at issue.1 30
The certificate has the effect of suspending the application for refugee
status. The Federal Court must determine whether the certificate is
"reasonable on the basis of the evidence." 131 The judge is required to
examine the intelligence evidence in camera and may do so exparte, but
129

See In From The Cold, supra note Iat 191-93.

130 The procedure was introduced by the ImmigrationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, following a
recommendation that a person claiming refugee status should have the opportunity to present his or
her case: W. Gunther Plaut, Refugee Determinationin Canada:Proposalsfor a New System. A Report
to the Hon. FloraMacDonald, MinisterofEmployment and Immigration (Ottawa: Supply & Services
Canada, 1985) at 86-87.
In two recent instances, cSts's alleged previous contacts with applicants for refugee status has
become a matter of public controversy when attempts were subsequently made to remove them
from Canada on security grounds. A Palestinian refugee claimant, Wahid Baroudh, was deported
to the Sudan in January 1996 on grounds connected with his membership of the PLO, despite a
finding from the Federal Court that he was not, as alleged, personally involved in terrorism.
Baroudh alleged that the action against him followed his refusal to cooperate with cals. In the
second instance, a former member of the Tamil Tigers, Thalayasingam Sivakumar, alleged that he
supplied information to css in exchange for a promise of safe haven in Canada. In January 1996
sntc launched an investigation into the allegations. On both Baroudh and Sivakumar: see Canadian
Associationof Security and IntelligenceStudies Newsletter (Spring 1996) No. 26 at 9-11.
131

ImmigrationAct, supra note 130, s. 40.1(4)(d).
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must provide the applicant with a summary in order to be reasonably
informed of the circumstances leading to the service of the certificate.
There are conflicting Federal Court decisions on what this test
requires. In one case, a ministerial certificate, which stated that the
applicants were a security threat because of alleged subversive and
terrorist activities, was found to be unreasonable.13 2 The decision
occurred during the Gulf War and the applicants (who were Iraqis) had
entered Canada on forged papers and in possession of a weapons price
list, and literature from a militant Shiite Muslim organization which had
engaged in terrorist activities against the Iraqi government. The judge
heard evidence from a csis officer in camera and reviewed relevant
security intelligence reports before holding that there was insufficient
evidence relating to the danger posed by applicants. Cullen J. found that
the authorities had failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required
in cases involving liberty of the person. However, the test has been
diluted by the Federal Court in later decisions. In Re FahariMahdavieh,133 Denault J. upheld a certificate served in proceedings for
M's removal and exclusion because there were reasonable grounds to
believe that she was a member of an organization that would engage in
acts of violence. The judge held that the Minister was not required to
show a high standard of probability that acts of violence would actually
occur. It was sufficient that M was a member of the Mujahedhin E
Khalq (a group whose objective was the overthrow of the Iranian
government) and that there was clear evidence linking the group with
the planning of an attack on the Iranian Ottawa embassy in 1992. The
judge expressly distinguished between the provision's requirement of
13 4 the Minister did not need to prove
reasonable suspicion andproof.
that the group was a terrorist one or that M was directly involved in the
attack. M's evidence on the nature of the group from an expert witness,
was finessed for the same reason 3 5 This decision was followed in a
later case in which Cullen J. appears to have had second thoughts about

132 Smith v. Canada,[1991] 3 F.C. 3 (T.D.) [hereinafter Smith].
133 (1993), 63 F.T.R. 120 (F.C.T.D.).
134

IbiL at 123 [emphasis added].
oiBL at 125-26. Compare Mackay J. who held inAl Yamani v. Canada(SolicitorGeneral),
[1996] 1 F.C. 174 (T.D.) [hereinafterAl Yamam], that the relevant burden of proof in the analogous
case of a non-refugee deportation on security grounds was the civil law standard of a balance of
probabilities. Consequently, he held that there were no grounds for overturning a finding by smc
that the complainant was a member of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, an
international terrorist organization likely to engage in acts of violence that would or could endanger
the lives or safety of persons in Canada.
135
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the test he applied in Smith.13 6 In Re Mohamed HusseinAl Hussein,13 7 a
certificate was served on the same ground, alleging that the applicant
was a member of Hizbollah, which, according to csis and the Minister,
was a known terrorist organization; the applicant admitted membership
in Hizbollah but denied being a terrorist carrying out assignments. After
quoting public source material which suggested that Hizbollah was not
exclusively a terrorist organization, the judge referred to Denault J.'s
standard and stated enigmatically, "I now agree." Cullen J. found that
the detailed evidence presented by csis indicated that the responsible
Minister had a "solid basis of evidence" on which to issue the certificate.
Federal Court challenges to government claims of evidential
privilege are also heard by designated judges but take a more limited
form, since they necessarily arise in the course of other proceedings.
Nevertheless, they are of interest in two respects. First, privilege claims
arise where security-related decisions by csis, sIc, or the Solicitor
General are subject to legal challenge: the availability of privilege affects
the openness of the decisions challenged. Second, the procedure for
claiming privilege is of interest in its own right as a form of secret
proceeding.
The Canada Evidence Act adopts a three-layered approach.
Generally, claims to Crown privilege are determined by the judge trying
the cases in which they arise; the judge has the discretion to inspect any
documents in question.138 However, where a certificate is served
claiming immunity for cabinet confidences, this is conclusive and there is
no judicial discretion to order disclosure or to inspect.139 Claims on
grounds relating to national security, defence, and international
relations occupy an intermediate position. The claim must be heard by
the Chief Justice of the Federal Court or by a judge designated by him
(this will usually involve the issue being remitted by the trial judge until
the privilege claim has been determined)1 40 This three-layered
approach replaced an earlier provision which made ministerial

136

Supra note 132.

137 (13 December 1993), File No. DES-8-93 (F.C.T.D.).
138 CanadaEvidenceAct, supra note 3, s. 37.
139

Ibid., s. 39, as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 1,s. 144(f).

140lbid, s. 38; and Cooper,supranote 36 at 130-38. See also P. Lordon, Crown Law (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1991) at 519-23. Although the federal government has announced that a working
group is reconsidering the whole question of the use of security information in the courts, no
proposals for reform have emerged: see On Course, supra note 75 at 49.
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certificates conclusive in these instances.141 Despite this change, in
practice there are few instances of the courts overruling governmental
claims to immunity. In addition to Crown privilege available under the
CanadaEvidenceAct, security considerations may arise in a common law
claim of informer privilege. 142 The potential overlap between informer
privilege and protection of national security appears anomalous in view
of the procedural advantages the government enjoys where the latter is
invoked. In practice, section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act has been
used to protect security sources in some instances where informer
privilege would have lain, and presumably this is the course the Crown
will normally follow where the former is available.
The Canada Evidence Act provision regarding privilege applies
both to criminal and civil cases. The proceedings must be held in camera
and the Act gives the person claiming the privilege (invariably the
government) an automatic right to be heard ex parte on demand.1 43
Effectively judicial discretion arises at three distinct stages: (1) in
deciding whether to inspect the documents in respect of which privilege
is claimed (the claim can be upheld without inspection); (2) if inspection
does take place, in upholding the claim; or (3) over the degree of
disclosure. It might have been thought that this scheme suggests that
claims of privilege on grounds of prejudice to national security, defence,
or international relations are to be treated less deferentially than before.
The availability of designated judges to hear these cases could be taken
to signal a legislative intention that government claims be treated
sceptically by a specialist cadre of judges exercising their discretion to
inspect the relevant documents. However, this has not been the
approach adopted by the courts.
In practice, the judges have erected a high initial threshhold
before they will be prepared to inspect the documents, with the majority
of claims to privilege upheld without inspection. Thus, in the context of
criminal trials involving security information, disclosure has been refused
without inspection on the ground that the defendants were unable to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the judge how the information
141 Section 41(2) of the FederalCourtAct, R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.), c. 10, as rep. by the Federal
CourtAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
142 See Lawler, supra note 36 at 122-27; and Cooper, supra note 36, c. 7. There is some
overlap between these sources of protection. Cooper, at 255, argues-from parallel provisions in
the Access to InformationAct, supra note 84 and the PrivacyAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, legislation
referring to protection of sources and introduced by the same provision as the exemptions under the

CanadaEvidence Act, supra note 3, s. 39-for the view that informer privilege may be claimable
under the protected public interests in the statutory scheme.

143 CanadaEvidence Act, supra note 3, ss. 38(5) and 38(6).
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requested would assist their defence1 44 The same approach has been
followed in a civil action for conspiracy arising from the applicant's
refusal of security clearance, where the application was refused 4 5
From the case law, a number of factors emerge as relevant both
to the question of whether the judge should inspect and to the balancing
exercise over disclosure. One is the importance of the case from the
claimant's behalf: this is a complex question involving both the type of
claim, and the probable effect of the outcome. Naturally, a defendant
who stands to lose his or her liberty though a criminal conviction may be
said to have a weightier interest than a plaintiff seeking compensation
for government action. However, it is too much of a simplification to say
that criminal cases will always have a higher weighting. There are dicta
suggesting that the severity of the probable sentence may be a factor in
addition to the simple question of the likelihood of conviction.
Moreover, if the issue about which evidence is sought is central to the
litigation, it may weigh heavier in a civil case than a peripheral issue in a
criminal case. Accordingly, a statement in one civil action that a
monetary claim could hardly ever outweigh an assertion of a threat to
national security from disclosure was criticized in the Federal Court of
Appeal.1 46 Other relevant factors include the age of the information
147
sought, and the international situation at the time of the request.
Although no one factor is decisive, the centrality of the information to
the litigation does emerge as a factor capable of outweighing other
considerations.
These principles can be seen in operation in instances where
judges have inspected security material. In one civil case involving a

144 Goguen v. Gibson, [1983] 2 F.C. 462 (C.A.) [hereinafter Goguen], affg [1983] 1 F.C. 872
(T.D.); and Kevork v. Canada (csis), [1984] 2 F.C. 753 (T.D.).
145 Gold v. Canada,[1986] 2 F.C. 129 (CA.) [hereinafter Gold]; see also Re Canada (Royal
CanadianMounted Police Complaints Commissioner), [1991] 1 F.C. 226 (T.D.) [hereinafter Re
Rankin], where disclosure of two intelligence files and a police manual was held to be unnecessary
for the disposal of a complaint against the police. The complaint was brought by an anti-nuclear
protester concerning excessive force in the policing of a demonstration. In R v. Praxis Corp. (1986),
9 F.T.R. 50 (F.C.T.D.), Addy J. refused an application to set aside a certificate in an action against
the R n, arising from the alleged actions of the security branch, alleging that disclosure would be
injurious to national security. The application failed because of lengthy delay (during which the
applicants had attempted to have the certificates lifted by political lobbying) and because the
applicants were unable to show any reason for the desire to inspect except a generalized suspicion
that it would assist their case.
146 See Gold, supra note 145.
14 7

See Goguen,supranote 144 at 904-05.
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challenge to refusal of security clearance, 148 the judge exercised the
discretion to examine the documents because it was plain from both
parties' submissions that the evidence in respect of which the privilege
was claimed (csis evidence about a particular organization) was
determinative of the issue in the action, namely whether the applicant's
membership of the organization made him a security threat. Having
examined the evidence, the certificate was upheld. In another civil
action, a certificate was used in an investigation by a health and safety
commission into how an army corporal obtained access to weapons and
ammunition for use in an attack on the Quebec Legislative Assembly
which left three people dead and nine wounded! 49 The commission had
sought full access to a report of an army inquiry into the incident,
whereas the government had deleted from the version handed over some
paragraphs dealing with security measures at a nearby army base. The
judge inspected the unedited version of the report but then upheld the
immunity claim. There are no reported cases in which a judge has
inspected material subject to a certificate under section 38 of the Canada
Evidence Act, and then ordered disclosure, even in part. A certificate
was quashed in one challenge arising from a criminal trial, but this was
on the procedural ground that the judge had incorrectly raised the
question of privilege, rather than waiting for an application from the
Crown! 50
The two-stage approach to inspection and disclosure mirrors
(perhaps too closely) that adopted in the common law of requiring the
litigant seeking access to the document to demonstrate relevance before
the judge will carry out inspection.151 The Canadian cases demonstrate
148

Henriev. Canada (smRc), [1989] 2 F.C. 229 (T.D.) [hereinafter Henrie].

149 Quebec (Commission de la Santg et de la SecuritJ du Travail) v. Canada (1989), [1990] 2
F.C. 392 (T.D.).
15 0
Atwal, supra note 82 at 144. The case concerned an attack on a warrant issued under the
csts Act, supra note 2, s. 21, and Marceau J. emphasized that, in his view, disclosure of the original
supporting affidavit (which the Crown was resisting) could scarcely have been more relevant to the

issue between the parties: see Atwal at 138. Following the decision, csis admitted inaccuracies in

the original warrant application and, following the resignation of the csis director, the warrant was
quashed. See also supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.

151 Burmah Oil v. Bank of England, [1980] A.C. 1090 (H.L.); and Air Canadav. Secretary of
State for Trade (No. 2), [1983] 2 A.C. 394 (H.L.). However, the recent Scott Report interprets the

U.. cases so that a judge is automatically bound to inspect documents for which privilege is
claimed in a criminal case and argues that class claims are inappropriate in a criminal context so
that no issue of balance arises: see Great Britain, House of Commons, Return to an Address of the
HonourableMinister dated 15 Februay1996 for the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence
Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions, H.C. (1995-96) 115, paras.

G.18.43ff. See generally I. Leigh & L. Lustgarten, "Five Volumes in Search of Accountability: The
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a great reluctance to overrule privilege claims, with the courts operating
a particularly stringent first limb to the test: few claimants have managed
to demonstrate the relevance of the documents they were seeking so as
to reach the inspection stage. The erection of such a high initial hurdle
can be seen as a somewhat disingenuous judicial technique for avoiding
openly favouring the state in balancing interests at the second stage.
Away from national security cases a different approach is discernible. In
Carey v. Ontario,152 the Supreme Court of Canada took a liberal
approach to the onus of proof in a privilege case involving Cabinet
documents of a provincial government. 153 The Court recognized the
difficulty a litigant faces in asserting the relevance of documents which
have not been disclosed and rejected the reasoning of the Federal Court
of Appeal that the plaintiff had to show more than bare relevance.1 54 It
commended, instead, more frequent judicial inspection of the
documents.
Although, overall, the judicial record is a disappointing one
which fails to mark a departure from the previous practice, there have
been indications that the judges recognize the potential importance of
their new position. Mahoney J. stated in Gold:
The executive had been unable to sustain the credibility of the system of absolute
privilege.... The new system was a politically necessary response to serious public
concerns. Effective judicial supervision is an essential element of the new system.
Among other aspects of the new system, its credibility is dependent on a public
appreciation that the competing public interests are, in fact, being judically balanced. It
will not be well served if it appears that the exercise of judicial discretion is automatically
abdicated because national security is accepted as so vital that the fair administration of
155
justice is assumed inacapable of outweighing it.

At present, though, it is difficult to conclude that the reality of
judicial supervision matches the promise implicit in the statutory
scheme. Sometimes the limitations on open justice in handling these
cases have been transparent: for instance, where the government is

Scott Report" (1996) 59 Mod. L. Rev. 695.

152 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 637 [hereinafter Carey].
153 At the provincial level, privilege rests on the common law. Federal Cabinet documents are
governed by a much-criticized provision (CanadaEvidence Act, supra note 3, s. 39, as am. by S.C.
1992, c. 1, s. 144(f)) purportedly conferring absolute protection on confidences of the Queen's Privy
Council in Canada: see Cooper,supra note 36 at 140-47 for a discussion of the constitutionality of
this provision.
154 Carey,supra note 152 at 677-83, La Forest J.
155 Gold,supra note 145 at 138.
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permitted to adduce a secret affidavit1 5 6 and ex parte arguments, or
where the judge comments on the need to generalize statements in his or
her judgment so as not to inadvertently provide details which could
157
themselves prejudice security.
The Crown privilege provisions have also been considered from
a constitutional perspective. Thus, they were held not to violate section
7 of the Charter, when applied to allow an RCMP officer to refuse to
answer questions on grounds of national security in an immigration
hearing, although the hearing could result in the applicant being
deported from Canada.158 Addy J. reasoned that to find that the
provisions conflicted with the Charter"would be tantamount to deciding
that the Charter holds within itself not only the seeds of its own
destruction but of all our rights, laws and institutions." 159 Although he
justified this position by comparison with cases upholding limitations on
disclosure in criminal cases, the constitutional question has not been
addressed in that context. An argument that the CanadaEvidence Act
violates section 11(d) of the Chartermight still succeed, in relation to
Cabinet confidences, because of the lack of judicial discretion, 160 and
arguably, in security cases because of the mandatory exparte provision
available to the Crown. Certainly, the standpoint of the courts in
security cases which require the applicant to demonstrate clear and
specific relevance is at odds with the attitude adopted to disclosure in
other criminal cases.1 61
Rather different considerations arise in relation to the Federal
Court's role under freedom of information legislation, since in these
cases the government's objection to the disclosure of the information is,
by definition, always central to the issue in question-the refusal of
access. There is, therefore, no place for the exercise of a judicial
discretion to refuse to inspect the documents. The judges' role must,
however, be understood in the context of the legislative scheme.
Freedom of information is provided for in Canada by two
parallel pieces of legislation passed in 1982: the Access to Information

1 56

InGoguen, supranote 144, a compromise was struck by allowing counsel to the applicants
(but not the applicants themselves) to have access to an affidavit of this kind.
1 57

See Henre,supra note 148.

15 8

Mohammad v. Canada (SolicitorGeneral) (1989), 23. F.T.R. 186 (T.D.).

159 Ibid. at 188.
160 See Cooper, supra note 36 at 144-45, arguing that the section may be rescued by the
Executive carrying out a balancing of interests.
161 See generally the discussion of the Parmarcases, supranote 55 and accompanying text.
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Act 162 (giving a right to documents held by government departments)
and the PrivacyAct 163 (providing a right to personal information held by
departments). EachAct contains numerous exemptions, but those most
relevant to this discussion protect information whose disclosure would
prejudice national security, defence, or international relations 64 An
applicant who is refused access may apply to an independent
ombudsman (the Information and Privacy Commissioners respectively),
who will review the refusal, and, where appropriate, attempt to obtain
greater disclosure.1 65 However, the Commissioners do not possess
powers to order a reluctant department to disclose information: coercive
powers lie with the Federal Court alone. After review by the
Commissioner, either the applicants or the Commissioner may apply to
the Federal Court for review of the department's refusal. The Federal
Court normally considers the question of entitlement to access on its
merits. However, the security exemptions are one of a number of
provisions where the court's role is ostensibly limited to considering
whether there are reasonable grounds on which the refusal is based.
Furthermore, cases related to the security exemptions are unusual since,
unlike other cases under the legislation, they are heard by designated
judges.
The Federal Court's performance in encouraging greater
disclosure in keeping with the spirit of this legislation has been mixed.
On the one hand, it has failed to require departments invoking security
exemptions to state the reasons for doing so in sufficient detail to guard
against potential misuse. Thus, although the statutory provision contains
a detailed list of nine types of harm which may be reasonably considered
injurious to foreign relations, defence, or the detection, prevention, or
suppression of subversive or hostile activities, the Court upheld a notice
of refusal of access which failed to specify which of these was

162

Supra note 84.

163

Supra note 142.
164 Access to InformationAct, supra note 84, s. 15; and PrivacyAct, supra note 142, s. 22.
Related exemptions apply to information whose disclosure would prejudice lawful investigations
(Access to Information Act, s. 16(1); PrivacyAct, s. 22(1)); to material received in confidence from

other governments or states (Access to InfornationAct, s. 13; PivacyAct, s. 19); to information from
csIs used for security clearances (PrivacyAct, s. 23); and for databanks exempted under an Order in

Council on security grounds (PrivacyAct, s. 18).
165 The Commissioner's investigations are conducted in private, are not subject formally to
the rules of evidence, and may involve receiving confidential submissions from one party not
disclosed to the other: see the comments of Rothstein J. in Canada (InformationCommissioner) v.

Canada(PrimeMinister), [1993] 1 F.C. 427 at 475-76 (T.D.) [hereinafter PrimeMinister].
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contemplated.166 Similarly, the Federal Court has upheld the practice
employed by csis of not specifically labelling deletions from documents
disclosed with the exemption applied but, instead, of referring to them in
a general covering letter.167 However, it has been held that a claim of
Crown privilege cannot be used to withhold documents from disclosure
to the applicant under the PrivacyAct.168 The consequence is that the
provisions enabling or requiring the withholding of information under
theAct are to be treated as a comprehensive code and may not be added
to by resort to privilege. Other decisions have increased the potential
for judicial scrutiny. In an important case concerning a data bank
exempt under the PrivacyAct, which was held by csis, the Court found
that it had jurisdiction to inspect files to ensure that they had been
properly included in the bank.169 The courts have also required it to be
shown that there is a "reasonable expectation of probable harm" even
when the Access to InformationAct allows information to be withheld
where disclosure "could reasonably be expected to" cause the specified
injury,170 as it does in the case of security exemptions.
The review procedure under the Access to InformationAct and
the PrivacyAct is similar to that under the CanadaEvidence Act171 and in
the refugee cases, in that they allow the Federal Court to hear
applications for review in camera. Furthermore, the head of the
government department is given the right to make applications in the
absence of the applicant172 and the Court is required to take every
reasonable precaution to prevent disclosure of material received in
camera or ex parteP73 However, in one Privacy Act case, the judge
attempted to cushion the effect of this by requiring the application for ex
parte proceedings to be made with the applicant's counsel present, who

166 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (NationalDefence), [1990] 3 F.C. 22
(T.D.).

167 Venneau v. Canada(SolicitorGeneral), [1988] 3 F.C. 336 (T.D.).
168 See also Davidson v. Canada(SolicitorGeneral), [1989] 2 F.C. 341 (C.A.).
169 Ternette v. Canada(Solicitor General), [1984] 2 F.C. 486 (T.D.); see also the later case

Temette v. Canada (SolicitorGeneral), [1992] 2. F.C. 75 (T.D.).
170 Canada PackersInc v. Canada (Agriculture), [1989] 1 F.C. 47 at 59-60 (C.A.), MacGuigan
J.A., in relation to the Access to Information Act, supra note 84, s. 20(1)(c) [emphasis in original];
P'me Minister, supra note 165, in relation to Access to Information Act, s. 14; see also Saint John

ShipbuildingLtd v. Canada(Supply & Services) (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 315 (F.C.T.D.).
171 Supra note 3.
1 72

PrivacyAct,supra note 142, s. 51; and Access to InformationAct,supra note 84, s. 50.

173 PrivacyAct,supra note 142, s. 46.
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therefore had the opportunity to object, and by inviting counsel to make
submissions and suggest specific questions which should be asked during
the closed hearing.' 7 4 The Court is obliged by section 47 of theAccess to
InformationAct to take every reasonable precaution to avoid disclosure
of information which the head of a government institution would be
authorized to refuse to disclose; this necessarily constrains the form of
judgment and the fullness of the reasons which may be given to an
applicant.
These procedures create a dilemma for judicial procedure when
compared to the ideal of open justice, conveniently summarized by
Jerome A.C.J.:
Proceedings in our courts must take place in full public view and in the presence of the
parties. Exceptions to this principle occur from time to time but must be kept to the
minimum of absolute necessity and then directions should be given such as to safeguard
the the public interest in the administration of justice and the rights of any parties
excluded from the proceedings. Since the issue in applications of this sort is
confidentiality obviously, a public hearing pre-empts the final decision so there does not
seem to be any alternative but to restrict attendance to counsel for the parties. A similar
concern arises with the question of access to the documents in dispute. Obviously,
counsel should not be asked to argue the nature of a document he has never seen, yet
access to the document again pre-empts the judicial determination. 175

Important constitutional issues about these procedures are
raised in a series of cases in which applicants are challenging refusals of
access to files allegedly held by csis.17 6 In Ruby,177 questions of whether
the exemptions under the Privacy Act and the procedure for review of

174 Reyes v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1985), 9 Admin. L.R. 296 at 301 (F.C.T.D.)
[hereinafter Reyes]; compare the procedure adopted by counsel to smc: see Part VII, below. See
also Russell v. Canada (Solicitor General) (1990), 35 F.T.R. 315 at 317-18 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter
RussellNo. 1], where precautions in favour of the government included removing the exparte,sealed
affidavits from the court file after use. InXv. Canada (NationalDefence), [1992] 1 F.C. 77 (T.D.),
Denault J. refused to allow cross-examination on affidavits submitted in a Federal Court review by
the Department.
175 Reyes, supra note 174 at 298-99; compare Denault J.'s comments in Maislin IndustriesLtd.
v. Canada (Industry, Trade Commerce and Regional Economic Expansion), [1984] 1 F.C. 939 at
942-43 (T.D.).
176 Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General) (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 74 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter
Ruby]. In addition, the decision of the Solicitor General to refuse to release some information
contrary to the Commissioner's advice (apparently the first time that a Minister has acted in this
way) is attacked as wrong in both fact and law. Cases also pending are: Copeland v. Canada(csts
and RCMP), No. T-1190-92 (F.C.T.D.); and Russell v. Canada (Solicitor General), No. T-1318-88
(F.C.T.D.).
177 Supra note 176.
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refusals contravene sections 7 and 8 of the Charter178 by failing to
provide a fair procedure for determining whether information should be
released. In the first limb of the litigation, 179 the court rejected a
challenge based on the alleged infringement of the applicants' privacy,
but did find a conflict between the procedures and the right to receive
information as an aspect of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of
the Charter. Since the provisions were mandatory, the court held that
they failed to allow a balance in each instance of the state's and the
individual's interests in closed and open hearings.
At a later stage in Ruby,180 Simpson J. found that the restriction
on section 2(b) could be justified as a reasonable limitation under
section 1 of the Charter. She found the objective behind the mandatory
in camera and exparte procedures in section 51 of the PrivacyAct to be
the need to satisfy Canada's intelligence partners that sensitive
information shared with Canadian agencies would be secure from
inadvertant disclosure. Affidavits filed by csis, the RCMP, and the
Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs all claimed, that
without the assurance of mandatory closure provisions for review of
access claims, intelligence sharing by foreign agencies was likely to be
adversely affected. The Oakes test181 was held to have been satisfied and
the applicant's argument that a less restrictive procedure could be used,
a procedure similar to that adopted by a judge editing a wiretap affidavit
in open court,18 2 was rejected as impractical;18 3 it could not be adapted
to situations where csis relied on the right to refuse to confirm or deny
the existence of information and would not be feasible where there were
numerous documents to be reviewed. Similarly, the American practice
whereby a court may review the Freedom of Information Act exemption
claims by way of a discretionary in camera process184 did not, in Simpson
J.'s view, undermine the minimal impairment claim. In the economy of
intelligence sharing, it was held, Canada as a "net importer," was in a
more vulnerable position and more reliant on its allies' perception and
178

An earlier constitutional challenge was struck out on procedural grounds in Russell No. 1,
supra note 174.
179 Ruby v. Canada (SolicitorGeneral), [1994] F.C.J. No. 789, Schedule A (amended reasons)
(QL).
180 Supra note 176.
181 See Oakes, supranote 22.
182 See supranotes 55-60.
183

Ruby, supra note 176 at 90.

184

See FreedomofInfonnationAct, 5 U.S.C. § 555(a)(4)(b) (1974).
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goodwill than was the United States, which was a "net exporter." 185
While the section 1 outcome is not surprising, in some respects the wider
reasoning is unsatisfactory. To treat the issue as one of freedom of
expression appears a highly artificial approach to the problem of secret
justice, since it essentially involved disregarding the applicant's special
interest in the execution of open justice as a party to the proceedings and
treating him or her purely as a "member of the reading public." 18 6 As a
consequence, the Court failed to adequately distinguish between the
constitutional impact of in camera and ex parte proceedings. Plainly,
though, the judgment can be seen as weakening the prospect of
successful challenges on constitutional grounds to the equivalent
Immigration Act and Canada Evidence Act provisions, because of the
essential similarities between them.
Overall, the designation of certain judges to hear intelligence
related cases is an experiment which has yet to fulfil its promise. Some
of the cases do indicate a more rigorous and probing approach by the
judges to the intelligence evidence: Smith,187 above all, stands out in this
respect. Equally, some of the cases arising in the freedom of
information jurisdiction show the judges approaching arguments about
the need to maintain the secrecy of old material with due scepticism.
However, in the Crown privilege realm, the reluctance of the courts to
inspect the material has frustrated the objective of designating specialist
judges to handle these cases. Refreshingly, there is little evidence in the
judgments of the characteristic approach of the common law towards the
non-justiciability of decisions based on security considerations; the
designated judges interviewed stated strongly their view that, where
individuals' rights were at stake, judicial involvement was appropriate.
Commendable attempts at procedural innovation have also been made
to maintain a measure of adversarialism even where the legislation

185 Ruby, supra note 176 at 92. The Australian practice of review by the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal, subject to mandatory in camera, but discretionary exparte process (ArchivesAct,
1983, Austl. Acts P. 1983, vol. 1, No. 79, s. 47(2)(a)), was also rejected by Simpson J. as a
reasonable example of minimal impairment, in view of the recommendation that had been made for
their reform; see Australia, Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Security Intelligence
Organization, ASlO and the Archives Act: The Effect on ASIO of the Operation ofAccess Provisionsof
theArchivesAct (Canberra: Queen's Printer, 1992) at 23-25.
186 See Parts II and III, above. Although Edmonton Journal,supra note 11, was cited by the
Court in Chiarelli v. Canada (Employment & Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 [hereinafter
Chiareli],for the proposition that freedom of expression under the Charter protects readers as well
as writers, the situation is quite different where a newspaper is challenging statutory publication
bans from where a party is doing so.
1 87
Supra note 132.
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requires the exclusion of the applicant from the proceedings. However,
the danger in using designated judges in conjunction with the exparte
hearing provisions is that the judges involved may become over-familiar
with and over-respectful of the types of arguments used to justify
security decisions. The tendency of intelligence services to make
decisions affecting individuals (such as denial of security clearance or
deportation) according to quite low levels of probability is one reason
the debate over probability and proof in relation to the refugee cases is
important. In the same way, it is disquieting to find judicial
endorsements of the "mosaic" argument (that the release of seemingly
innocuous information may be compromising because a knowledgeable
person may be able to piece it together with other information to which
he or she has access) 1s8 in some of the decisions under the Canada
Evidence Act and under the freedom of information legislation.
The final form of review to be considered is another variation on
specialist review. However, the personnel involved are not judges. They
are Privy Councillors who are members of the Security Intelligence
Review Committee.
VII. HEARINGS OF THE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
REVIEW COMMITTEE

SIRC;18 9

This part concentrates upon the complaints and curial roles of
however, in order to understand SIRC'S work it is essential to

188 This "mosaic" argument is referred to, although not using that term, by Addy J. in Henrie,
supra note 148.
189 sntc comprises five Privy Councillors (who must not be members of either House of
Parliament), chosen by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition; the
convention of appointing two members from opposition parties presents an intriguing prospect with
the collapse, in the 1993 federal election, of the Conservative Party and the emergence of the Bloc
Quebecois as the Opposition. There has never been a Bloc Quebecois member of sntc
notwithstanding that many of the abuses leading to the establishment of csis involved Rcri'
monitoring and interference with Quebec politics. As of August 1996, the membership of sic was:
Edwin A. Goodman (a Toronto lawyer), Rosemary Brown (Chair of the Ontario Human Rights
Commission and former member of the British Columbia Legislature), Paule Gauthier (a Quebec
City lawyer), and George W. Vari (a prominent construction magnate). The fifth committee
member position was vacant as of August 1996.
For more general assessments of smc, see P. Gill, "Symbolic or Real? The Impact of smc,
1984-88" 4 Intelligence and Nat'l Sec. 550; Politics of Security,supra note 78; BfistowAffair, supra
note 83; and In From The Cold,supra note 1 at 458-66. For discussion of its complaints jurisdiction,
see also M. Rankin, "The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National Security
With Procedural Fairness" (1989-90) 3 Can. J. Admin. Law & Prac. 173.
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appreciate that it also has another legislative function, that of
investigation and review of csis. It was the clear intention of those who
produced the legislation that these two functions should inform each
other, although, at certain points there may be a tension between the
two roles. The McDonald Commission had recommended that separate
bodies be established to undertake reviews and to receive complaints: it
envisaged a Security Appeals Tribunal to hear appeals in the fields of
immigration, citizenship, and security clearance. 90 The Tribunal would
have been presided over by a Federal Court judge. It would have had
full access to security information with a discretion over what
information it could disclose, but would have been advisory rather than
binding in its determinations. Realizing the danger that a tribunal of
this kind could lack insight into the policy context in which individual
complaints arose, McDonald J. recommended that it should have a
broad jurisdiction and that it should automatically see reports of other
cases containing adverse information, but where no appeal was made.
However, this division was not followed in the csIsAct, probably because
the Liberal government had already added to the complexity of the
review function by dividing it between the Inspector General and SIRC.
Accordingly, siRC was given a dual mandate.
In interviews, csis personnel described the effect of this
interrelationship on complaints proceedings as "schizophrenic." The
criticism was that case hearings had a tendency to turn into review
hearings as siRC pursued items of interest which related to policy and
oversight, but which were beyond the scope of the complainant's case.
SIRC, on the other hand, stressed the usefulness of the interrelatedness of
the functions: in view of the part-time involvement of members of SIRC,
complaints hearings were seen as a crucial means by which the members
(rather than the permanent staff) obtained an insight into the
operational work of CSiS. Counsel to SIRC confirmed that, on occasion,
reviews had grown out of case hearings. Occasionally, the reverse has
happened: for instance, when a siRc report criticizing CSiS interviews

with Palestinians during the Gulf War was published, 191 it led to an
individual complaint about CsIs action from one of the interviewees
concerned.

190McDonaldCommission Report,supra note 74, vol. 1 at 421-26 and vol. 2 at 805-11.
191 Canada, Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report 1990-91 (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1991) at 15-16 [hereinafter siRc 1990-91].
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smc hearings can be subdivided into three kinds: complaints
about the alleged action of csis;192 review of refusal of security
clearances brought by government employees (these can arise from any
government department); 193 and review of certain findings in
immigration cases (these are reviews of refusals of citizenship and of
recommendations of deportation where it is alleged that a person is
either a security threat or, following conviction for a serious criminal
offence, that they are involved in organized crime). Although smc only
has the power to make recommendations at the end of a case hearing, in
practice these recommendations have been followed by the Minister
concerned in the overwhelming majority of cases.
The format of case hearings is unusual and worthy of greater
study. It is governed partly by the requirements of the csisAct itself and
partly by procedural rules which siRc has promulgated under authority
of the Act. The rules194 establish different procedures for the different
kinds of cases that may arise in sinc hearings. However, common
provisions deal with the question of representations by the complainant.
The complainant has a right under the csis Act to an oral hearing but, if
this is not exercised, the hearing may be dealt with by written
representations.1 95 The rules put the discretion squarely on the
Committee members hearing the case to decide a number of critical
questions about representation and evidence "balancing the
requirements of preventing threats to the security of Canada and
providing fairness to the person affected. '196 The right to receive the
substance of the representations made by the other party, the ability to
cross-examine witnesses called by other parties, to exclude a party from
portions of the hearing, and to decide whether that party is given the
substance of the evidence or representations from which they were
excluded, are all subject to this test. However, in all cases, smIc is
192 Before making a complaint of this kind, the individual is required to raise the issue with
csis so that it can be resolved informally if possible. In practice, a large proportion of complainants
neglect to do so, resulting in referral back from sIRC. The government has rejected calls for
amendment to the legislation to do away with this preliminary stage, from those who argued that it

deterred complainants: see On Course, supranote 75 at 73-74.
193 Ile Federal Court also has jurisdiction over some aspects of security clearance decisions.

An analogous, but minor, area of sIRC work is complaints raising from security aspects of
government procurement decisions.
194 See Rules of Procedure of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (adopted 9 March
1985) [hereinafter Rules; unpublished], in relation to its function under the csisAct, supranote 2, s.
38(c).
195
cstsAct, supranote 2, s. 48.
196

Rules, supranote 194.
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required by section 37 of the csis Act to consult with csis before allowing
access to the information, evidence, or representations.
So far as the public interest is concerned, no attempt has been
made by a newspaper or other member of the public to test the
requirement (section 48(1) of the csis Act) that all case hearings are to
be held in private. Theoretically, as a mandatory closure provision, it is
open to attack under section 2(b) of the Charter. However, in view of
the propensity of the courts to exclude the applicant from parts of sIRc
proceedings (discussed below), there seems little doubt that the section
would be upheld, possibly under section 1. In any event, even if the
public access were granted, it would be minimal because the
discretionary closure of smc proceedings excluding the complainant (at
which point they become ex parte as well as in camera) would plainly
meet the tests developed in the newspaper cases discussed earlier.197
In practice, hearings follow a fairly common format. sIRC
appoints counsel to assist it in these hearings from a panel of
security-cleared private practitioners. There will be one or a number of
pre-hearing conferences in which counsel appointed by SIRC will meet
with the other lawyers involved in the case. The purpose, according to
lawyers who have acted for sine, is to establish the "ground rules" for the
conduct of the hearing, to ensure that lawyers unfamiliar with the
procedure understand how it should work, and to pinpoint the main
areas of disagreement which need to be addressed in the hearing (and
the procedure which will be applied to them).1 98
However,
understandably, it is impossible to foresee every eventuality at this stage
and csis officials, in particular, were of the opinion that cases seldom
followed the established format. Typically, after the hearing has been
opened, a formal submission from csis will be made for the hearing of
evidence 199 and representations in camera, and this will be opposed by
counsel for the complainant. From the experience of all those
interviewed, the motion is invariably granted. It is during the in camera
portions of the hearing that the role of counsel to SIRC becomes critical.
19 7 See supra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
198 In SIRC 1994-95, supra note 83 at 68-69, the Committee states that, as a cost-cutting
measure, the pre-hearing role of counsel is being increasingly undertaken "in house" by its own
staff.

199 Interviews with M. Archdeacon (Executive Director of smc) (21 June 1994) Ottawa, Ont;
and Prof. R. Whitaker (complainants' counsel) (1994) North York, Ont., revealed that evidence has
been received in "open" session and with cross-examination from some csis witnesses (especially
intelligence analysts), independent witnesses called by srRc as experts, and by witnesses called by
complainants. However, evidence dealing with sources (informers) and surveillance tends to be
heard exparte. According to sic, much written evidence is also relied on.
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One counsel who had acted in some twenty or so cases before
smc described the role as being threefold: first, to assist the members of
the Committee in the conduct of the proceedings (with an emphasis on
providing a fair and complete hearing); second, to help the complainant
in what was described as a "bizarre situation;" and third, to
cross-examine csis evidence in the in camera portion of the
proceedings. 00 The position of counsel and the role they play will vary
according to the attitude and conduct of the proceedings by the
presiding member. One such counsel felt that counsel to smc had a
clearer role to play in the proceedings when the Chair was an activist one
(that is, following an inquisitorial format) than when the Chair was
playing a more judicial, and non-interventionist role. In the second
situation, ambiguity and conflict in the tasks that counsel was required to
perform were likely to arise. This interviewee specifically cited
analogous case law upon the role of counsel before administrative
tribunals 2 01 Another variable affecting the role of counsel to SiRC is the
competence (or absence) of the legal representatives for the
complainant. Although one or two counsel have experience
representing several complainants before smc, it is more common for
counsel to be involved in a single, isolated case. In these circumstances,
counsel for srRc may compensate by taking a more active role so that the
complainant is not disadvantaged by the inexperience or unfamiliarity
with in camera proceedings of his or her representative.
Two tasks of counsel to srRc are particularly important:
cross-examining in the in camera portion of the proceedings (one
counsel described this as attempting "to fill the vacuum of the
complainant's absence"), and negotiating with counsel for csis on the
form of evidence to be disclosed from this portion of the hearings.
Additionally, counsel acting for smc will liaise with the complainant's
counsel to ensure that the questions the latter wishes to see answered
are put in the closed session; this can be extensive (more than fifty such
questions were put in one hearing). However, counsel to smc,
complainants' counsel, and smRc all expressed scepticism about the
practical utility of this facility. Both siRc personnel and counsel to smc
argued that, through ignorance of aspects of csis evidence, such
questions tended to be peripheral to the central issues in the hearing.
200 Interview with S. Noel (counsel to smc) (22 June 1994) Hull, Quebec. The "bizarre
situation" to which he refers is meant to convey the unusual nature of the proceedings and the
position of a complainant in those proceedings, rather than to a particular incident.
201 See M. Rankin & L. Greathead, "Advising The Board: The State Of Counsel's Role In
Advising Administrative Tribunals" (1993) 7 Can. . Admin. Law & Prac. 29.
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Likewise, without knowledge of csis's evidence, counsel to the
complainant faced inevitable difficulties in preparing for this vicarious
cross-examination.
The practice of smc has, until recently, been to release a
summary of the evidence heard in camera. The summary will initially be
prepared by counsel for csis and then smc will usually attempt to argue
for greater disclosure, sometimes with some success. One counsel to
smc considered that the release of merely a summary to the complainant
was fairly uninformative and of little assistance. However, in one recent
case 202 a different practice was adopted, with a "blanked-out" transcript
of the evidence received in camera disclosed instead. This was described
by counsel to the complainant in the case (who had experience of the
former practice also) as being of much more assistance, since it enabled
more effective cross-examination. csis officials, on the other hand, were
more dubious about the practice, but apparently for the same reasons.
smc regarded the new procedure a positive development.
The constitutionality of smc's procedures was challenged in the
case of a review of a deportation of a permanent resident based on the
complainant's alleged links with organized crime. Although security
information was not involved (the information came from police
informers), the procedures adopted by smc for the protection of
informers were identical to those in security cases. The approaches
taken by the Federal Court of Appeal 2 3 and the Supreme Court of
Canada2°4 were radically different. The Federal Court of Appeal held,
first, that the procedure raised questions under section 7 of the Charter,
regarding the protection of individual security 2 05 Furthermore, the SIRC
procedures were held to be in violation of fundamental justice as
required by section 7, since the complainant should be given a
"meaningful opportunity to be heard," and therefore was entitled to
know the information before smc, in order to contradict it.206 However,
the court divided on the question of whether this violation could be
justified under section 1. The majority (Stone J.A. with Urie J.A.
concurring) found it was not, since, although protecting police sources
202 Other aspects were challenged by the complainant inA Yamani, supra note 135.
203 Chiarelliv. Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1990] 2 F.C. 299 (C.A.) [hereinafter
ChiarelliF.C.].
204 See Chiarelli,supranote 186, critically discussed in R.P. Cohen, "Fundamental (In)Justice:
The Deportation of Long-Term Residents From Canada" (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.. 457 at 470ff.
205 The effect had been to deprive the deportee of the right to appeal to the Immigration
Appeal Board on compassionate grounds where a ministerial certificate was filed.
2 06
ChiarelliF.C.,supranote 203 at 318-19.
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and techniques was sufficiently important to justify overriding
constitutional rights, and the method chosen demonstrated a rational
connection with the objective, it failed the proportionality test because it
did not balance the competing state and individual rights and, instead,
obliterated the individual's right. Pratte J.A. (dissenting) argued that
section 48(2) of the csisAct imposed a reasonable limit in the light of the
need to protect the secrecy of police investigations of organized criminal
activities and the restricted right of the complainant being infringed.
When the Supreme Court of Canada considered the case, Sopinka J., for
the majority, held that a requirement of deportation following conviction
for an offence carrying a maximum punishment of five years
imprisonment did not constitute aprimafacie infringement of section 7.
However, the Court went on to consider the argument about smc
procedures notwithstanding, finding that the procedures for review of
the certificate by srRc were not in contravention of fundamental justice,
nor did they involve a breach of natural justice. This part of the
judgment repays greater study.
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the principles of
fundamental justice under section 7, and under the rules of natural
justice in administrative law, had to be construed contextually. Canadian
immigration law had never contained an unlimited right of appeal in
security cases: historically there had always been either unfettered
ministerial discretion or an exception from the normal appellate
procedures. The statutory right of appeal on compassionate grounds
was deferred, and then excluded, if the Governor in Council directed the
Minister to issue a certificate indicating that the deportee was involved
in organized crime following a report from sIRc; but, in any event, there
was no obligation to provide a right of appeal on compassionate grounds
in deportation cases of persons convicted of any offence. Furthermore,
accepting that Parliament had done more than was required in providing
the smc machinery, the srRc rules of procedure involved a reasonable
balance between the interests of the state and of the individual. This is
because they conferred discretion on the Committee to balance the
competing interests, and the procedure provided for the complainant to
know the substance of the case against him or her, and to be able to
respond. In view of the state interests in protecting police sources and
techniques, fundamental justice did not require that the complainant be
given details of the techniques or sources used to gather the information.
It followed that no section I issue arose.
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Chiarelli20 7 arose in an anomalous part of smc's jurisdiction, that
concerned with deportations of those convicted of serious offences and
suspected of involvement with organized crime. However, subsequently
the same principles have been applied in a deportation case concerned
with other inadmissable classes of persons based on security 08
Although in such instances, the state interests are arguably clearer, the
individual's conduct is also less clearly reprehensible: there is no prior
conviction to trigger the procedure. InAl Yamani, MacKay J. held that
although the SIRC procedures could not be faulted, the statutory ground
for the deportation 209 violated the protection in section 2 of the Charter
for freedom of association, because it penalized mere membership of a
suspect organization and did not constitute a reasonable limitation
under section 1. smc's procedures have not yet been challenged outside
of deportation cases. If a contextual approach to constitutional
protection is taken, a court might be more receptive to a challenge to the
procedure in a non-immigration case. However, only in security
clearance cases will the applicant have sufficient economic
considerations at stake to make litigation worthwhile and to raise
constitutional questions.
Figures for the outcomes of smc hearings show that of a total of
sixty-six hearings conducted in the period 1984-1994, some thirty-six
resulted in favour of the complainant (see Table II, below). 210 However,
because of the mixed nature of SIRC's jurisdiction, these figures do not
amount to direct successes against csis, since the largest body of
successful complainants, by far, were those involving challenges to
denials security clearances brought against the Department of National
2 07

Supra note 186.
208 In Al Yamani, supra note 135 at 231-32, Mackay J. held that Chiarelli,ibid, precluded
objection under s. 7 of the Charterto smc's processes in a security-related deportation. In Canepa v.
Canada (Employment andImmigration), [1992] 3 F.C. 270 at 277 (C-A), MacGuigan JA. stated that
the ratio in Chiarelli,precluded challenge under s. 7 of the Charterto any of the restrictions on the
right of permanent residents to remain in Canada, not merely serious criminal offences.
209 See ImmigrationAct, supra note 130, s. 19(1)(g), relating to "persons who there are
reasonable grounds to believe ... are members ... of an organization that is likely to engage in ... acts
... of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada." See also Al
Yamani, supra note at 238-45. However, in McAllister v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
[1996] F.CJ. No. 177 (QL), a refugee case involving a security certificate, MacKay J. found that
there was no error in law in holding the applicant to be a member of an inadmissable class where he
admitted he had been a member of a terrorist organization (the Irish National Liberation Army)
and had been convicted of terrorist offences.
210 These figures are taken from smc 1993-94,supra note 99 at 39-41. sIRc 1994-95,supranote
83 at 47ff, describes the handling of a number of later cases but does not make clear how many
involved formal hearings.
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Defence (DND) (smc claims a significant success in changing DND'S policy
on security clearances following these complaints). Of the twelve
hearings which involved direct complaints against Csis, four were upheld,
a success rate of 33 per cent.
Table H
siC Formal Hearings, 1984-1994

csisAct, Section 41 (Complaints Against csis)
Total Heard

Findings in Favour of Complainant
Finidngs in Favour of csis

12

4
8

csisAct, Section 42 (Security Clearance Denials)
Total Heard

38

Findings in Favour of Complainant

27

Findings in Favour of csis

11

ImmigrationAct Cases
Total Heard
Findings in Favour of Subject
Findings in Favour of Exclusion or Deportation

8
1
7

CitizenshipAct Cases
Total Heard
Findings in Favour of Granting

7
4

Findings for Denial

3

Canadian Human RightsAct Cases
Total Heard
Findings in Favour of Complainant

1
0

Findings in Favour of Government

1

Source: SIRc Annual Reports.

However, sensitive to press criticism, sIRc has also pointed out that in six
of the eight "unsuccessful" claims, csis was ultimately criticized to some
degree in the SIRC report. A further 474 complaints were dealt with by
administrative action short of a hearing over the same period; of these a
total of seventy-six were satisfactorily resolved without a formal hearing.
The remainder included 197 outside smc's jurisdiction, 211 fifty-four
211 In many cases, this was because the complainant had not contacted csis before
approaching sRc as required under the procedure. In such cases, smc advised the complainant of
the correct procedure; nothing more was heard in ninety-five cases.
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complaints which were abandoned or withdrawn, and a further sixty-nine
which were deemed to be irrational or nuisance complaints (perhaps an
irreducible minimum in view of the field of work). Thus, of all 277
complaints received within siRC's jurisdiction, the complainant was
212
apparently satisfied with. the outcome in 112 cases.
A fair degree of satisfaction was expressed by all concerned with
the form of siRC hearings. One complainant's counsel, who had
extensive experience both before the introduction of SiRC and after,
described the Committee as a considerable improvement and made the
point that SIRC had successfully obtained greater disclosure from Csis in
hearings since the inception of both organizations in 1984. This was,
however, coupled with a criticism: the consequence was that
complainants today were more likely to receive a fair hearing than those
in preceding years. SIRC itself claimed to have had a positive impact
upon csis. This was partly through a perceived improvement in the
presentation and argument of decisions brought for review, and partly
through pushing csis toward greater disclosure without compromising
security.
After considering a complaint, siRc issues a report which may
contain "recommendations." The use of "recommendations" in section
52(2) of the csIs Act has been interpeted by the Supreme Court of
Canada, in a case concerning review of security clearance, to mean that
the Deputy Minister is not obliged to follow siRc's opinion. 213 The
majority found that the power (derived from the prerogative) to issue or
refuse security clearances still resided with the Deputy Minister, despite
procedural provisions dealing with the matter under the csis Act; the
siRc report was taken to be no more than an additional source of
information for reaching the decision, which could be disregarded or
outweighed by other factors. The term "recommendation" was to be
given its "plain and ordinary meaning. ' '21 4
However, as
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. argued in a dissent, the non-binding nature of the
report sits uneasily in the context of the elaborate procedural
212 In a further five cases, csis withdrew its initial objections to citizenship or immigration
approvals.

213 Thomson v. Canada (Dep.Min. of Agriculture), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 385 at 403 [hereinafter
Thomson], where the Deputy Minister of Agriculture Canada was held to be entitled to rescind a
job offer following an adverse security report from csis, notwithstanding a report from siRC that
they did not consider the complainant to be a risk, and recommended granting the security
clearance. The adverse security report was based on Thomson's admission that he had
unauthorizedly disclosed classified information to a Canadian Member of Parliament some twelve
years earlier, siRc took the view that there was no prospect of a recurrence.
214Ibid.

1996]

Secret Proceedingsin Canada

mechanisms surrounding SIRc hearings. Rather, the complexity of the
scheme, in providing prior notice, hearings, the summoning of witnesses,
and so on, militated against regarding the SIRC report as merely
suggestive. It was further suggested that, in view of the statutory
provisions dealing with the role of the Deputy Minister in security
clearance complaints, it would be contrary to natural justice to allow that
official, after sic hearings to which the Deputy Minister had been party,
simply to revert to the original decision without further explanation or
opportunity to make representations. 215 In practice, despite the decision
in Thomson,2 16 SIRC'S view was that its recommendation had been
followed in the overwelming majority of cases, perhaps because
departments would inevitably face considerable adverse publicity in
going against a reasoned sic report. The government has resisted
proposals to amend the legislation to make recommendations of siRc
binding, arguing that to do so would cut across the responsibility of
Deputy Ministers for their departments by requiring them to retain staff
2 17
against whom they had security reservations.
Nevertheless, the lack of effective redress for a complainant to
smc was seen by complainants' counsel as deterring complaints. In
particular, the inability to award monetary compensation equivalent to
damages meant that there was little incentive to make a general
complaint about csis under section 41 of the csis Act (as opposed to
section 42 complaints concerning citizenship, deportation, or security
clearance).
Another potential area of reform is procedural. One counsel to
complainants who had extensive experience argued that sIRc had too
little say on the question of disclosure during hearings. A related
question was the reluctance of sIRc to order disclosure of transcripts
obtained by csis through wiretapping, 21 8 even where it was obvious from
the questions that csis asked of a complainant that such surveillance had
taken place. It was questioned whether, in circumstances where it was
obvious that wiretapping had occurred, there was any point in
withholding the transcript. Once again, because of the attitude of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Chiarelli, it seems improbable that the

215 Ibid. at 416.
216 Supra note 213.
2 17

See On Course, supranote 75 at 75.
218 Access of this kind was granted in Chiarell4supra note 186, but withheld in Al Yamani,
supra note 135.
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withholding of such a transcript could be challenged. 219 Nonetheless,
complainants to sIRc are treated differently to criminal defendants
seeking access to wiretap material? 20 In view of the outcome in
Chiarelli, it is plainly improbable that any judicial control of the editing
of the evidence released to the complainant by siRc, analogous to that in
the criminal law wiretapping jurisdiction, will develop. Moreover, as a
specialist tribunal within the security field, smc's judgments over
disclosure would be difficult for a court to displace. smc's policy of
withholding material only "where necessary" is, in any event, equivalent
to the test operating in the criminal sphere.
It has also been suggested that the procedure would be fairer if
complainant's counsel were security cleared and, therefore, able to argue
in the in camera portion of the hearing. Plainly, such a procedure could
only satisfy the state's concerns if counsel operated under a form of
self-imposed quarantine from the client, contrary to normal professional
ethics. The argument that this would create an artificial barrier between
client and counsel221 was met with the argument from complainant's
counsel that if the client was in agreement with the procedure then there
could be little objection to it. Interestingly, the counsel proposing this
reform had specifically refrained from briefing counsel to SIRC with
questions to be put forth during the in camera portion of proceedings,
preferring instead to see the written summary and then cross-examine in
person during the open part of the hearing. A complaint about the
exclusion of complainant's counsel was an unsuccessful ground of
challenge in Al Yamani. It was alleged, among other issues, that SIRC'S
handling of a deportation review case breached section 7 of the Charter,
violating fundamental justice by excluding the complainant and his
lawyer from parts of the hearing and evidence. The complainant argued
that SIRC failed to strike an appropriate balance between the state's and
the individual's interests because of its failure to allow for a system of
security-cleared counsel representing the complainant in those parts of
the hearing from which the complainant was excluded. MacKay J. held
219 See Al Yamani, supra note 135 at 230-38, where a challenge under the common-law
requirements of fundamental justice, based on the amount of material disclosed by smc, also failed.
220 See, mutatis mutandis, the discussion of editing material in wiretapping cases, supra notes
52-57 and accompanying text.

221 The House of Lords has criticized such practice in England on the ground that it creates a
divide between counsel and the client: see R.v. Preston, [1993] 4 All E.R. 638 at 671 (H.L.), Mustill
L.J.;
compare the comments of Ackerman J.in the South African case of S. v. Leepile (4) (1986), 3
S.A. 661 (W), cited in Marcus, supra note 16 at 217, describing a proposed order of this kind as
"unconscionable" and "destructive of the professional relationship between the accused and his
legal representative."
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that Chiarelliwas binding on the section 7 issue and that there had been
no breach of the common-law requirements of fundamental justice in
the procedures adopted by smc, since the complainant had sufficient
information to know the substance of the allegations against him and to
respond. The judge stated that "[f]undamental justice in the context of
security reviews, does not require disclosure of full details of the
intelligence sources or techniques or the bases of conclusions
reached."222 This ruling obviously has implications for all forms of cc
parte procedure considered in this article.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we can return to the question posed at the outset:
to what extent have the secret procedures examined succeeded in
rendering the review of security decisions subject to the normal
standards of open justice?
So far as the role of the courts is concerned, a curious trend
emerges. Unlike in Britain, where national security is a notorious
exception to statutory and common-law rights,223 the Canadian courts
have approached the issue obliquely and on several levels. It is initially
striking that the non-justiciability argument, which has been featured
regularly in the British cases, has not been invoked to render security
decisions immune or to restrict procedural rights. Indeed, the breadth
of justiciability under the Charter ostensibly extends to decisions of
extreme sensitivity at the heart of the executive. However, the
procedural rights of natural justice and fundamental justice have been
given a "contextual" interpretation, with the result that they are
curtailed in the security realm.
More striking, however, is the relatively few cases in which
section 1 of the Charterhas been applied to uphold the state's security
concerns. This is more unusual still when one considers the frequency
with which it has been invoked as a justification for deviations from open
justice for other reasons. Instead, the courts seem to have engaged in
restricted interpretations of the primary rights under the Charterso that
the question of reasonable limitation never arises. This trend can be
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seen at work in relation to section 7 in Chiarelli,224 section 8 in Atwal,225
and section 2(b) in the ccLA case.226 The only exceptions to this type of
approach were the majority judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in
ChiarelliF.C.227 and the judgment of MacKay J. inAl Yamani.228
It is submitted that avoiding the section 1 question has some
unfortunate implications. The first is that the state avoids the rigour of
having to satisfy the Oakes tests.229 These are more structured and
demanding than inchoate notions of "context" and "balance." Arguably,
the Charterbecomes redundant since analysis is effectively equivalent to
the common-law approach. In any event, balance and context are
unsatisfactory tests-the state's and the individual's interests are
incommensurable. Moreover, the notion of "context" applied by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Chiarelliis self-defeating since it is purely
historical rather than purposive. A better approach would be to
consider the overall balance of the controls under the csis Act.23 0 The
European courts view this approach as "necessary in a democratic
society" under the restrictions to Arts. 8-11 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.23 1 The real question is over justiciability and the
constitutional competence of procedures for handling security questions
(i.e., whether a court substitute and adversarial procedures are
appropriate). This has yet to be squarely faced as a question under
section 1 of the Charter.
However, if the courts have failed to impose rigorous standards
through their interpretations of the Charter in the cases which have
arisen, this does not imply a total absence of constitutionalism. The
preceding account gives much evidence of the incorporation of
standards of disclosure of evidence and regard to privacy values by other
bodies, irrespective of the courts' indifference. This shows a recognition
that just because procedures are applied in secret does not require them
to be applied wholly ex parte. The experiments with adversarial
procedure undertaken by SIRC in its hearings, and to a lesser extent by
224

Supra note 186.

225 Supra note 82.
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Supra note 112.
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Supra note 203.
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Supra note 135.
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Supra note 22.

230 However, in Chiarelli,supra note 186, this difficulty may have been obscured because the
case arose in the organized crime part of smc's jurisdiction.
231 See In From The Cold, supra note 1 at 68-72.
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csis (in relation to section 21 warrant applications), suggest an effective
"internalization" of Charter values by building them into the relevant
procedures. Some of these innovations, especially the role of counsel to
smc, the independent counsel operating in section 21 cases, and the
release of edited summaries of ex parte evidence, would be easily
adaptable to exparte proceedings involving judicial personnel.
This is not to say that security decisions have been made
unexceptional according to normal adversarial standards. Significant
departures from open justice still exist. However, the innovations
described in this article have been created to avoid a stark choice
between closed and open proceedings. They suggest a sliding scale or
proportionate response to the protection of fundamental state interests
in keeping with section 1P22 Further improvements could still be made,
but the problems and suggestions for reform highlighted in the previous
sections must be understood in context. The Canadian procedures are
among the most innovative in the world for dealing with the eternal
problem of reconciling state interests and individual rights. They could
be usefully copied elsewhere, not least in Britain.

232 In a helpful discussion, a former Chair of smc has advocated a sliding-scale response to
national security under the Charter. see R. Atkey, "Reconciling Freedom of Expression and
National Security" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 38.

